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Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and
Successive Class Actions
Rhonda Wasserman
Abstract
Timing is everything. Even the most meritorious lawsuit will be dismissed if
the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff’s claim. In class action litigation,
this hurdle is particularly daunting. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that if
a class action complaint is timely filed, then the claims of all class members are
deemed timely. Likewise, if a motion to certify the class is denied, absent class
members may seek to intervene in the pending action or to file individual actions
and either way, the statute of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of the class
action complaint until denial of the motion to certify. But what if the absent class
members seek to present their claims collectively in the context of a successive
class action? Is the statute of limitations tolled in this context as well?
Intuitively, one might think that the same policies that justify tolling in the first
two situations also justify tolling in the successive class action context. Yet a ma-
jority of the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue have denied
tolling in the successive class action context. Given the volume of class action
litigation, the lack of control that absent class members have over the timing of
the certification decision, and the devastating effect the statute of limitations may
have on their claims, it behooves us to understand why the courts have resolved
the tolling issue for successive class actions differently and whether such differ-
ential treatment is justified.
This Article analyzes three sets of policies that have influenced the courts in this
context: the policies underlying statutes of limitations; the policies underlying
Rule 23; and the policies underlying preclusion doctrine. A careful analysis of
these competing policies calls the majority rule into question in two common cir-
cumstances: where certification initially was denied because of a problem with
the class representative or because of a problem with the class itself that the suc-
cessive class action seeks to remedy. Only where there is a problem with the
class itself and the successive class action fails to address that problem does the
combination of relevant policies counsel against tolling.
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B., Cornell University,
1980; J.D., Yale Law School, 1983. I would like to thank Joel Friedman, Sam Issacharoff, Jules
Lobel, Margaret Mahoney, George Rutherglen, Joan Steinman, and Tobias Barrington Wolff for
their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am grateful to Christina Yaeger for
her diligent research assistance. I dedicate this Article with great pride and much love to Eric and
Scott Wasserman Stern on the occasion of their B’nai Mitzvah.
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Abstract:
Timing is everything. Even the most meritorious lawsuit will be
dismissed if the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff’s claim. In
class action litigation, this hurdle is particularly daunting. Supreme Court
precedent makes clear that if a class action complaint is timely filed, then
the claims of all class members are deemed timely. Likewise, if a motion
to certify the class is denied, absent class members may seek to intervene
in the pending action or to file individual actions and either way, the statute
of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of the class action complaint
until denial of the motion to certify. But what if the absent class members
seek to present their claims collectively in the context of a successive class
action? Is the statute of limitations tolled in this context as well?
Intuitively, one might think that the same policies that justify tolling in
the first two situations also justify tolling in the successive class action
context. Yet a majority of the federal Courts of Appeals that have
addressed this issue have denied tolling in the successive class action
context. Given the volume of class action litigation, the lack of control that
absent class members have over the timing of the certification decision,
and the devastating effect the statute of limitations may have on their
claims, it behooves us to understand why the courts have resolved the
tolling issue for successive class actions differently and whether such
differential treatment is justified.
This Article analyzes three sets of policies that have influenced the
courts in this context: the policies underlying statutes of limitations; the
policies underlying Rule 23; and the policies underlying preclusion
doctrine. A careful analysis of these competing policies calls the majority
rule into question in two common circumstances: where certification
initially was denied because of a problem with the class representative or
because of a problem with the class itself that the successive class action
seeks to remedy. Only where there is a problem with the class itself and the
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successive class action fails to address that problem does the combination
of relevant policies counsel against tolling.
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1. Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996).
2. According to the Supreme Court:
[T]he word “tolling” [means] that during the relevant period, the statute of
limitations ceases to run. “Tolling effect” refers to the method of calculating the
amount of time available to file suit after tolling has ended. The statute of
limitations might merely be suspended; if so, the plaintiff must file within the
amount of time left in the limitations period. If the limitations period is renewed,
then the plaintiff has the benefit of a new period as long as the original. It is also
possible to establish a fixed period such as six months or one year during which
the plaintiff may file suit, without regard to the length of the original limitations
period or the amount of time left when tolling began.
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 652 n.1 (1983).
3. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
4. Id. at 552-53. If state law supplies the statute of limitations, then state law ordinarily
determines the particular tolling effect of a prior class action. See Chardon, 462 U.S. at 654, 661-62
(holding that Puerto Rican law, under which the one-year statute of limitations period began anew
C. Analysis of the Preclusion Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
  VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
“Though rarely the subject of sustained scholarly attention, the law
concerning statutes of limitations fairly bristles with subtle, intricate, often
misunderstood issues . . . .”1
I.  INTRODUCTION
Timing is everything. Even the most meritorious lawsuit will be
dismissed if the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff’s claim. It
seems such a simple hurdle to overcome: just file a complaint (or serve the
defendant) within the limitations period. But in the context of class action
litigation, the statute of limitations hurdle may be more impervious.
Assume that a class action complaint is timely filed. What if class
certification is denied after the statute of limitations has run and the absent
class members then seek to press their claims? In determining whether
their claims are time-barred, does it matter if the absent class members
proceed individually or initiate a successive class action?
For more than thirty years, it has been well accepted that the filing of
a class action complaint tolls  the statute of limitations applicable to the2
claims of absent class members. In 1974 in American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah,  the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations is3
suspended for the period between the filing of a class action complaint and
the denial of a motion to certify the class when, upon denial of class
certification for a lack of numerosity, absent class members seek to
intervene in the action to press their individual claims.  Likewise, in 19834
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following a denial of class certification, governed a section 1983 action filed in federal court in
Puerto Rico). See also Kathleen L. Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied:
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686, 687 (1985)
(criticizing the Chardon Court for “improperly narrow[ing] the scope of American Pipe’s
interpretation of Rule 23 and expand[ing] the potential for confusion in class action litigation”).
5. 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
6. Id. at 353-54.
7. Courts have also had to consider whether the statute of limitations is tolled during the
pendency of a class action if a new plaintiff seeks to join the existing suit, through intervention or
otherwise, and to represent the class upon a determination that the original putative representative
fails to present typical claims, proves to be an inadequate representative, or lacks standing. See, e.g.,
McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2002); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l
Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1975); Popoola v. MD-Individual Practice Ass’n, 230
F.R.D. 424, 428-30 (D. Md. 2005); see also Recent Case, Civil Procedure—Class Actions—Third
Circuit Holds That the Filing of a Class Action Tolls the Statute of Limitations for a Subsequent
Class Action When the Initial Denial of Class Certification Is Unrelated to the Appropriateness of
the Underlying Claims for Class Treatment, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2230 (2003) (discussing McKowan
Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2002)) [hereinafter McKowan Lowe
Comment]. Such “new representative” cases are not successive class actions because there is only
one class action—the suit brought by the original putative representative and sought to be
maintained by another. This difference is important because the amended complaint that names a
new representative may “relate back” to the date of filing of the original complaint under Rule 15(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a possibility that does not exist in the successive class
action context. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (stating the rule on “[r]elation [b]ack of [a]mendments”);
6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1501 (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 2005). This Article does not separately address the “new representative” cases, although the
policy analysis undertaken in Part V applies in both the successive class action and “new
representative” contexts.
Nor does the Article address the additional considerations that arise when the later action is
filed in a different judicial system from the earlier class action. See, e.g., Wade v. Danek Med., Inc.,
182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that Virginia “would not adopt a cross-jurisdictional
equitable tolling rule” because it is not concerned with the efficiency objectives of other
jurisdictions and it would not want to face “a flood of subsequent filings” upon the dismissal of
class actions in other fora); see also Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The
Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
532, 568 (1996) (arguing that “[f]ederal courts should not rely upon [American Pipe] to toll state
statutes of limitations applicable to state law claims” and “state courts should recognize that
whether the filing of a class action, in a state or federal court, should toll a state limitations period
is exclusively a matter of state law”); Angela de Sanctis Myers, Comment, Civil
Procedure—Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.: The Tennessee Supreme Court’s Rejection of
the Doctrine of Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 521, 536 (2002) (reviewing state
in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,  the Court held that the statute5
of limitations is tolled when, upon denial of class certification, absent
class members decline to intervene in the putative class action but seek
instead to initiate their own independent lawsuits.  But what if, upon6
denial of certification, absent class members decline to
intervene and decline to initiate their own individual lawsuits, but
instead seek to press their claims in the context of a
successive class action initiated by a new class representative?7
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opinions addressing cross-jurisdictional tolling and arguing that borrowing statutes will protect
states from inundation by absent class members whose class claims were denied certification in
another state); cf. Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 112 (3d Cir. 2004) (downplaying the risk of forum-
shopping by “‘unhappy plaintiffs’ lawyers who cannot obtain class certification in the original court
of their choosing’” and “hold[ing] that American Pipe tolling allows litigants whose individual
lawsuits would have been timely with the benefit of tolling due to an earlier class action to
aggregate their claims in a substantively identical class suit so long as the denial of certification in
the earlier action was based solely on Rule 23”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005).
8. See infra Part II.B for a more complete discussion of the statute of limitations policies.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Many states have modeled their class action rule on Rule 23. H.R.
REP. NO. 108-144, at 9 (2003) (stating that “[t]hirty-six states have adopted [Rule 23 as their state
rule], some with minor revisions”).
10. See infra Part III.B.1 for a more complete discussion of the Rule 23 policies.
Intuitively, one might think that the same policies that justify tolling in the
first two situations also justify tolling in the successive class action
context. Yet as we will see, a majority of the federal Courts of Appeals that
have addressed this issue have denied tolling in the successive class action
context. Given the volume of class action litigation, the lack of control that
absent class members have over the timing of the certification decision,
and the devastating effect the statute of limitations may have on their
claims, it behooves us to understand why the courts have resolved the
tolling issue for successive class actions differently and whether such
differential treatment is justified.
In deciding American Pipe and Crown, Cork, the Supreme Court
considered two sets of policies: those underlying the statutes of limitations
and those underlying Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Statutes of limitations balance several competing interests. These interests
include repose for prospective defendants, protection for courts from the
obligation to adjudicate stale claims, reduction in the volume of litigation,
assurance for prospective plaintiffs of a reasonable period of time in which
to sue, and enforcement of the substantive laws underlying the plaintiffs’
claims.  This set of competing interests will be referred to as the “statute8
of limitations policies.”
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class action
practice in federal court.  Rule 23 is designed both to promote judicial9
economy and efficiency by permitting the presentation of many claims in
a single proceeding (thereby reducing the volume of litigation) and to
provide a vehicle for the presentation of claims so small in value that they
would not be brought in court unless they could be presented collectively.10
These interests will be referred to as the “Rule 23 policies.”
By tolling the statute of limitations during the pendency of a class
action, the Supreme Court in American Pipe and Crown, Cork took into
account both the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies. It
noted that the filing of the class action complaint puts the defendant on
notice of the number and nature of the claims against it and the need to
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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11. See infra Part IV.A & B for a discussion of claim and issue preclusion and their
application in the context of successive class actions.
12. See infra Part IV.A for a more complete discussion of the preclusion policies.
13. This Article employs a three-ring structure in analyzing the policies underlying the statute
of limitations, Rule 23 and preclusion doctrine. Cf. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 104 (5th ed. 2006) (using a Venn diagram to illustrate the “three
rings of civil procedure”: personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue).
prepare a defense. Moreover, it concluded that the efficiency objective of
Rule 23 is served if the statute of limitations is tolled. Such tolling
discourages the filing of precautionary lawsuits and motions to intervene
by absent class members who were happy to remain behind the scenes as
long as the class action proceeded but who do not want to forfeit their
claims to a statute of limitations defense in the event class certification is
denied.
At first blush, it seems that these same policies are served by tolling the
statute of limitations in the successive class action context. The original
class action complaint puts the defendant on notice of the claims against
it, and tolling discourages the filing of duplicative class actions as a
precaution, thereby serving the Rule 23 policies. Yet the Courts of Appeals
have not been inclined to toll the statute of limitations for successive class
actions. Why not?
In declining to toll the statute of limitations in the successive class
action context, the lower federal courts have introduced a third set of
policies into the analysis, those underlying preclusion law. Preclusion law
bars relitigation of claims and issues that already were presented in a prior
proceeding.  This body of law promotes finality and repose, efficiency and11
judicial economy, consistency, and respect for the integrity of judicial
decisions.  These interests will be referred to as the “preclusion policies.”12
This Article will consider whether preclusion doctrine itself bars
relitigation of the class claim or the certification issue, and if it does not,
whether it is appropriate for courts to consider the preclusion policies in
deciding whether to toll the statute of limitations for successive class
actions. Put differently, we will seek to resolve whether the preclusion
policies justify a denial of tolling in the successive class action context
notwithstanding American Pipe and Crown, Cork.13
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Part II of this Article examines statutes of limitations and the policies
they embody. First it introduces the topic of statutes of limitations
generally, including the source of the statutes of limitations that govern
federal claims. Then it addresses in greater detail the competing policies
that statutes of limitations attempt to balance. Part III considers the
circumstances in which statutes of limitations are tolled. It identifies a
variety of circumstances in which legislatures themselves have tolled
statutes of limitations through the enactment of tolling and saving statutes
and then it considers the circumstances in which courts invoke equitable
principles to toll the statute of limitations. With this background on tolling
established, Part III then elaborates upon the Rule 23 policies and the
Supreme Court’s decisions in American Pipe and Crown, Cork, which
invoked both the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies to
justify tolling in the class action context. Part III also analyzes opinions of
the lower federal courts applying the American Pipe tolling rule in two
different procedural settings. A review of these opinions demonstrates that
the lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and have
continued to balance the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23
policies in deciding tolling issues.
Part IV then moves on to the successive class action context. First it
introduces preclusion policies generally and then it considers why
preclusion doctrine ordinarily does not preclude a successive class action
following the denial of class certification in an earlier class action. It then
analyzes the opinions of the lower federal courts that have addressed the
tolling issue in the successive class action context, demonstrating how
these courts have introduced the preclusion policies into the mix of policies
considered in determining whether to toll the statute of limitations. Part V
undertakes an independent analysis of the three sets of policies that
influence the tolling issue in the successive class action context. Finally,
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14. Kerri M. Milliken, The Lucas Exception: Inclusion, Exclusion, and a Statute of
Limitation, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 134, 151 (1999); see also THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS
OF CRIME, EXTENSIONS OF THE CRIMINAL & CIVIL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES (1998), at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&
DocumentID=32466 (discussing statutes of limitation on sexual offenses against children)
[hereinafter NCVC website]. For a discussion of the origin of statutes of limitations, see WILLIAM
D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 7-47 (1978).
15. See, e.g., 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 202(a), at 462 (1984 & Supp.
2004-05); Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses
at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 249-50 & n.223 (1995); NCVC website, supra note 14.
16. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 202(a), at 462-63.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006); see also 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 1.6, at 117-18 (Supp. 1991 & 1993) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281-87, 3290-92).
19. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (2006) (claims by Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation); 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006) (antitrust claims); 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (securities
claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006) (securities fraud claims); 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (2006) (private
rights of action under the False Claims Act).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a); see also Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382
(2004) (concluding that § 1658(a) applies “if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made
possible by a post-1990 enactment” that amended a pre-existing statute).
Part VI reaches a conclusion at odds with the approach taken by a majority
of the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue.
II.  THE FIRST RING: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS POLICIES
A.  An Introduction to Statutes of Limitations
All fifty states have enacted statutes of limitations that specify the time
periods in which claimants may file suit for civil wrongs, such as torts and
breach of contract.  Likewise, almost all states have enacted statutes of14
limitations that prescribe the time periods in which the government may
file criminal charges against an alleged wrongdoer.  The more serious the15
offense, the longer the period of time in which the charges may be brought;
in many states, there is no time limitation on charges for capital offenses.16
The statutes of limitations that govern federal claims derive from a
variety of sources. While prosecutions for capital offenses may be
commenced at any time,  Congress has enacted a general five-year statute17
of limitations for non-capital criminal offenses.   On the civil side, several18
statutes specify the time period during which claimants may bring suit on
particular federal claims.  A four-year statute of limitations governs all19
civil claims arising under federal statutes enacted since December 1, 1990,
that do not otherwise specify a statute of limitations.  In the absence of an20
applicable federal statute of limitations, courts usually borrow the most
analogous state statute of limitations and the corresponding state tolling
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art44
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21. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 40 n.6 (1987);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655-57
(1983); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1056, at 273, 278 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2005); 19 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4519, at 627 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp.
2005); B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Federal Court’s Adoption of State Period of Limitation, in Action
to Enforce Federally Created Right, As Including Related or Subsidiary State Laws or Rules as to
Limitations, 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963 & 1993 Later Case Service & 2005 Supp.) (discussing cases
where the federal courts applied state limitation periods and considered the applicability of related
state laws on limitations).
22. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (quoting DelCostello v. Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983)); see, e.g., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S.
319, 334 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 462.
23. North Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 34. Even when state law supplies the statute of
limitations, federal law usually determines when a federal claim accrues. 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 21, § 4519, at 622; accord Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
24. For a discussion of the policies underlying statutes of limitations in the criminal context,
see 2 ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 202(b); Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970).
25. See, e.g., 1 CORMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 11-13; FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 43; see
also Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J.
281, 290-91 (describing procedural and substantive functions of limitations law).
26. See, e.g., 1 CORMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 11; Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
736 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Note, Statutes of
Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 399, 413 (1982) [hereinafter
Michigan Note]. A “subsidiary aim of the statute of limitations [is] promptly to resolve disputes in
order that commercial and other activities can continue unencumbered by the threat of litigation.”
Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 86 n.4 (Cal. 1974) (citations omitted); accord Cerveny, supra note
4, at 687. In real property actions, where the defendant may have possessed property for a lengthy
period of time and made improvements on it, the statute of limitations protects the “defendant’s
rules,  unless state limitations law would “‘frustrate or interfere with the21
implementation of national policies,’ or be ‘at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law . . . ,’”  in which case the courts22
“look[] for a period that might be provided by analogous federal law, more
in harmony with the objectives of the immediate cause of action.”23
B.  The Statute of Limitations Policies
Regardless of their source, in the civil litigation context  statutes of24
limitations balance a number of competing interests, several of which
counsel in favor of relatively short periods of time in which to sue. First,
as long as a risk of litigation lingers, prospective defendants may worry
about their potential liability and the need to preserve evidence to defend
themselves.  Thus, by limiting the time period in which litigation may be25
brought, statutes of limitations provide prospective defendants with
repose.  Second, statutes of limitations protect courts from the obligation26
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possession, improvements and labors . . . .” FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 43.
27. See, e.g., Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 730 (describing “[a] State’s interest in . . . determining
when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated”); id. at 736 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (describing a State’s “procedural interest in freeing its courts from
adjudicating stale claims”); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944); 1 CORMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 16-17.
28. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 7, at 534 (footnotes omitted); see also Sun Oil, 486 U.S.
at 730 (mentioning “State’s interest in regulating the workload of its courts”).
29. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (citations omitted); see also
1 CORMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 13.
30. Professor William Ferguson has argued that absent concern for the defendant or the
public, this concern would not justify statutes of limitations because “[i]f plaintiff wished to assume
the risk that his witnesses would die or his evidence be lost, it does not seem appropriate to say he
cannot run that risk.” FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 42.
31. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (stating that “[s]tatutes of
limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants”).
32. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
33. FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 42.
34. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (noting that “the policy of repose . . . is frequently
outweighed . . . where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s rights”); 1
CORMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 14.
to adjudicate stale claims with the attendant risks of lost evidence, absent
witnesses, fading memories, and ultimately, inaccurate fact-finding.27
Third, by limiting the amount of time in which plaintiffs may bring claims,
statutes of limitations protect the judicial system “by reducing the volume
of litigation.”  Fourth, statutes of limitations “prevent plaintiffs from28
sleeping on their rights. . . .”  In other words, they provide plaintiffs with29
a strong incentive to pursue their claims expeditiously.  Finally, short30
statutes of limitations may reflect legislative skepticism about particular
claims.
Of all the interests that counsel in favor of relatively short periods of
time in which to sue, protection of the defendant predominates.  This31
predominance is demonstrated by the fact that the statute of limitations is
a defense that may be raised only by the defendant.  If the defendant32
declines to raise it, the statute of limitations defense is waived and the
court has no independent means to raise the statute of limitations to protect
itself from stale claims or voluminous litigation.33
Balanced against these interests are several competing interests that
counsel in favor of providing plaintiffs with relatively long periods of time
in which to sue. First, injured claimants need a reasonable period of time
in which to recover from their injuries, consult with counsel, assess the
merits of their claims and consider alternatives to litigation before their
opportunity to commence suit expires.  Second and related, the34
substantive policy objectives that underlie the plaintiff’s claim (for
example, to deter negligence or price fixing or discrimination) demand that
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35. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (describing the state’s “substantive interest in vindicating
substantive claims”).
36. For a discussion of tolling of the limitations period in the criminal context, see 2
ROBINSON, supra note 15, at § 202(d). A tolling rule is distinguishable from “[a] discovery rule [,
which] delays the accrual of a cause of action. . . . [U]nder a typical discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff knew or with reasonable diligence should have
known of the damage and the cause of the damage.” Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 22
F.3d 248, 250 (10th Cir. 1994). See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1056, at 239
(discussing the “blurred distinction between accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action and . . . tolling
of the limitations period”); Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations,
37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 502-03 (2004) (characterizing both discovery and tolling rules as
“‘equitable exceptions’” to the statute of limitations but arguing that each different type of equitable
relief should be addressed on its own) (footnote omitted); id. at 502-07 (describing different
equitable exceptions); Cerveny, supra note 4, at 689 (explaining that “tolling should cease when
a plaintiff knows or should know of the fraud or tort committed against him”).
37. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1983) (applying the state rule that “after
tolling comes to an end, the statute of limitations begins to run anew”). See Cerveny, supra note
4, at 689-90 (explaining the suspension and renewal effects of tolling).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-8 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352(a) (West 2006); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-211 (2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (Consol. 2005); see also ADOLPH J. LEVY,
the plaintiff be afforded a reasonable period of time in which to sue. In
other words, if the statute of limitations were unreasonably short, not only
would the prospective plaintiff be unfairly denied an opportunity to seek
compensation for her injuries, but the policy objectives underlying her
claim would be frustrated and neither specific nor general deterrence
would be achieved.35
III.  THE SECOND RING: THE RULE 23 POLICIES AND TOLLING IN THE
CLASS ACTION CONTEXT
A.  An Introduction to Tolling
1.  Tolling Statutes
Even though the balance of the statute of limitations policies ordinarily
justifies limiting the period of time in which plaintiffs may file suit, other
considerations occasionally require a tolling of the statutory period.  In36
other words, other factors may dictate that the time period in which the
plaintiff has to commence suit may be either suspended or stopped and
restarted anew in certain circumstances.  In some cases, the legislature37
itself specifies the circumstances in which the statute of limitations may be
tolled. For example, many statutes provide that if the prospective claimant
is a child at the time the claim accrues, then the statute of limitations is
tolled until the person reaches the age of majority.  Many statutes also toll38
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SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS §§ 4.23 & 6.27 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
39. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 12-302 (2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-211 (2005); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 208 (Consol. 2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 2004); see
also LEVY, supra note 38, §§ 4.22 & 4.24; Michigan Note, supra note 26, at 404-05 n.21 (stating
that “[m]any statutes of limitations explicitly provide for suspension of the statute for the traditional
disabilities”); cf. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5533(a) (2004) (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by statute, insanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for the
commencement of a matter”).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-92 (West 2004). In most other states, the courts toll the statute of
limitations until an administrator is appointed to represent the state. See generally F.V. Lapine,
Annotation, Statute of Limitations: Effect of Delay in Appointing Administrator or Other
Representative on Cause of Action Accruing At or After Death of Person in Whose Favor It Would
Have Accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1969 & Supp. 2005); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Tolling or
Interruption of Running of Statute of Limitations Pending Appointment of Executor or
Administrator for Tortfeasor in Personal Injury or Death Action, 47 A.L.R.3d 179 (1973 & Supp.
2005).
41. The incapacitated claimant, through a representative, may file her claim during the period
provided by the statute of limitations, but the law ordinarily relieves her of the obligation to do so.
If the incapacitated claimant has a legal representative (such as a guardian, conservator or next
friend) at the time her claim accrues, or one is appointed after the claim accrues but before
termination of the disability, “some courts adopt[] the view that the appointment of a legal
representative triggers the running of the statute of limitations, and others hold[] that,
notwithstanding the appointment of a legal representative, the toll continues.” Michele Meyer
McCarthy, Effect of Appointment of Legal Representative for Person Under Mental Disability on
Running of State Statute of Limitations Against Such Person, 111 A.L.R.5th 159, § 2(a) (2003).
42. Accord FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 42 (stating that the “disability provisions of the
statutes . . . clearly show that the public interest that controversy come to an end gives way to the
the running of the statute of limitations for the period of time in which a
potential claimant suffers from a mental disability or a legal disability,
such as imprisonment.  And at least one state statute tolls the statute of39
limitations for the period of time during which an estate is unrepresented.40
In all of these instances, the claimants are incapable of filing suit during
the period provided by the otherwise applicable statute of limitations.41
Even though the defendants are not responsible for the plaintiffs’
incapacity, the legislatures have readjusted the balance struck by the
standard statutes of limitations and have afforded these prospective
plaintiffs additional time in which to sue. The tolling provisions are
designed to ensure that potential claimants have a reasonable opportunity
after they are capable of suing to gather evidence and to determine whether
a lawsuit is in their best interests, and to ensure that the policies embodied
in the substantive laws underlying their claims may be vindicated through
private litigation. Even though the defendants are deprived of repose
during this additional period of time and even though the courts may have
to adjudicate stale claims, the legislatures have made the judgment that in
these circumstances affording the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to sue
outweighs these other concerns.42
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desire for fairness to enable plaintiff to protect his interest”); id. at 44.
43. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 351 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-9 (West
2005); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 207 (Consol. 2006); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.063 (Vernon
2005). See also 2 CORMAN, supra note 18, §§ 9.3, 9.4, at 46-47 (noting that “recent cases hold that
when [substituted service of process] is available, the statute of limitations will not be tolled during
the absence of the departing, or already absent, party”); LEVY, supra note 38, § 4.28.
44. LEVY, supra note 38, § 6.32, at 248 & n.108; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21,
§ 1056, at 273; Cerveny, supra note 4, at 690. In a 1965 opinion, the Supreme Court identified
thirty-one state saving statutes. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 431-32 n.9 (1965);
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-592 (West 2006); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 205(a) (Consol. 2006); see also FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 55-56 (discussing saving
statutes).
45. FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 44, 55-59.
46. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524
U.S. 38, 48 (1998)); see also Bain & Colella, supra note 36, at 493 (advocating “a comprehensive
interpretive approach for determining when Congress intends to include (or exclude) equitable
considerations in a statute of limitations”). See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21,
§ 1056, at 255-62 (discussing “the doctrine of equitable tolling”).
If state legislatures are willing to toll the statute of limitations where the
plaintiffs’ need for additional time is not the defendants’ fault, it is no
surprise that they also are willing to toll the statute of limitations where the
defendants’ conduct gives rise to the need for additional time. For
example, most states toll the statutes of limitations for the period of time
during which the defendant is absent from the state and not amenable to
service of process.  It would be unfair to deprive the plaintiff of an43
opportunity to pursue her claim if the defendant left the only jurisdiction
in which service of process could be made until after the statute of
limitations had run.
2.  Saving Statutes
In addition to tolling statutes, many state legislatures have enacted
saving statutes, which afford the plaintiff a period of time in which to refile
a claim (beyond the standard statutory period) if she commenced a timely
suit that was terminated on procedural grounds or if she obtained a final
judgment in her favor that was reversed on appeal on procedural grounds.44
These statutes protect the plaintiff’s claim and vindicate the substantive
policies underlying it, while recognizing that the initial lawsuit provided
the defendant with notice of the claim and a reasonable opportunity to
gather and preserve evidence needed in its defense.45
3.  Equitable Tolling Principles
Even in the absence of express tolling or saving statutes, the courts
have tolled the statute of limitations where equity so demands “unless
tolling would be ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.’”  Such46
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47. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73
P.3d 517, 523 (Cal. 2003)).
48. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 426 (1965) (quoting Midstate Horticultural
Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 360 (1943)).
49. Id. at 427.
50. Id.; accord Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982).
51. Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50.
52. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
53. See id. at 397; see also supra note 36 (discussing the distinction between a discovery rule
and a tolling rule).
54. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348
(1875)); see also Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2004); 2 CORMAN,
supra note 18, § 8.2, at 3. Some state statutes expressly adopt discovery rules for cases involving
fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (West 2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 5-219(4) (2006), cited in LEVY, supra note 38, § 4.30, at 142-43.
55. See, e.g., Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 521, 532-35 (Cal. 2003); see also Glus
equitable tolling is designed “to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of
causes of action, where the defendant would suffer no prejudice.”47
The United States Supreme Court has framed the equitable tolling issue
as “one of ‘legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after
the prescribed time.’”  Put differently, the Court has asked “whether48
congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in
given circumstances.”  To determine legislative intent, the Court considers49
the policies underlying the statute of limitations, the policies underlying the
substantive law that the plaintiff relies upon, and the remedial scheme
developed to enforce the rights granted by the substantive law.  The Court50
has gone so far as to state that “Congress must be presumed to draft
[statutes of] limitations” with background equitable tolling principles in
mind.51
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht,  a case involving a discovery rule of52
accrual,  the Supreme Court discussed the paradigmatic case for equitable53
relief from the statute of limitations: 
[W]here a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and “remains in
ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care
on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until
the fraud is discovered, though there be no special
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing
the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other
party.”  54
A related but distinct doctrine, equitable estoppel, bars the defendant from
invoking the statute of limitations if the defendant’s conduct induced the
plaintiff to refrain from filing suit within the period provided by the statute
of limitations.55
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v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959) (stating that plaintiff has the burden of
proving that defendant’s conduct resulted in plaintiff’s delay in filing suit); LEVY, supra note 38,
§ 1.23, at 21; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1056, at 263-66 (describing equitable estoppel
doctrine); Bain & Colella, supra note 36, at 503-05 (describing equitable estoppel as an “equitable
principle that one may not take advantage of one’s own wrong”) (footnote omitted); Bruce A.
McGovern, The New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its
History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, 65 MO. L. REV. 797, 809 (2000)
(describing the “distinction between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel [as] . . . elusive”); cf.
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (explaining that the federal courts have
allowed equitable tolling “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass”) (footnote omitted).
56. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 38, § 6.32 at 248; see also Bain & Colella, supra note 36, at
504-05 (listing situations where courts have applied equitable tolling). The Court has tolled the
statute of limitations in other appropriate cases. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50-
51 (2002); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (declining to toll
the statute of limitations on the facts of the case, but identifying a variety of circumstances in which
the statute had been tolled).
57. Hosogai v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327, 1333 (Ariz. 1985) (citation omitted). Similar
considerations underlie Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits an
amended pleading to relate back to the date of the original pleading. See supra note 7.
58. 525 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1974).
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id.
Even in the absence of fraud, concealment or other misconduct on the
part of the defendant, courts have tolled the statute of limitations for the
period of time during which the plaintiff pursued administrative remedies
or prosecuted a lawsuit on the same claim that was ultimately dismissed on
procedural grounds.  Just as legislatures have enacted saving statutes to56
toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of prior litigation on the
same claim, courts have equitably tolled the statute of limitations in these
circumstances. According to one state supreme court:
The . . . requirements for the equitable tolling doctrine are as
follows: 1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first
claim; 2) lack of prejudice to the defendant in gathering
evidence to defend against the second claim; [and] 3)
reasonable and good faith conduct by the plaintiff in
prosecuting the first action and diligence in filing the second
action.57
Consider an illustrative case. In Elkins v. Derby,  the plaintiff had been58
attacked by a performing timber wolf while working at Animal Kingdom,
the defendant’s premises.  The plaintiff filed a timely claim for worker’s59
compensation benefits.  After several months, the board determined that60
the plaintiff had not been an employee of the defendant at the time of the
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
818 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 82-83.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 84 (quoting Myers v. County of Orange, 6 Cal. App. 3d 626, 634 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970)) (rest of citations omitted).
69. Id. at 88; see also Hosogai v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Ariz. 1985) (considering
whether the remedial policies underlying the plaintiff’s substantive claim would be furthered if the
statute of limitations were tolled).
injury, so it denied benefits.  A month later, the plaintiff filed a civil suit61
against the defendant in state court seeking damages for the same injury.62
Since the civil suit was filed more than one year after the accident had
occurred, the defendant raised the statute of limitations as a defense.63
While recognizing that the plaintiff could have preserved his right to
sue by filing the civil complaint during the pendency of the worker’s
compensation proceeding, the California Supreme Court concluded that
“an awkward duplication of procedures is not necessary to serve the
fundamental purpose of the limitations statute, which is to insure timely
notice to an adverse party so that he can assemble a defense when the facts
are still fresh.”  Since the filing of the worker’s compensation claim put64
the defendant on notice, tolling the statute of limitations in these
circumstances would not frustrate its primary purpose.  Tolling, moreover,65
would obviate the need for duplicative proceedings, which “would entail
the filing of cases in our heavily burdened superior courts that would be
mooted whenever the board decided it had jurisdiction to grant relief.”66
Likewise, tolling the statute of limitations (and thereby avoiding the need
for a precautionary lawsuit during the pendency of a worker’s
compensation proceeding) would relieve the plaintiff of the need to file
inconsistent pleadings (alleging before the worker’s compensation tribunal
that he was an employee injured during the course of his employment, and
alleging before the court that he was not).  The court concluded “that67
regardless of whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the
pursuit of another, if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, the running
of the limitations period is tolled ‘[w]hen an injured person has several
legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.’”  Thus, the68
court tolled the statute of limitations because the statute’s primary purpose
already had been achieved and a denial of tolling would have denied the
injured plaintiff a remedy and would have created a perverse incentive to
engage in “inequitable, burdensome [and] dysfunctional” duplicative
filings.69
As we will see in the section that follows, similar concerns have
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70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating the “[p]rerequisites to a [c]lass [a]ction”).
71. 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:46, at 463
(4th ed. 2002); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.1, at 757-58 (4th ed. 2005);
5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02, at 23-23 (3d ed. 2002); Edward F.
Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 509 (1987).
72. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.20, at 642 (5th ed. 2001); Kenneth
W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 47, 52 (1975).
73. 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 5:7, at 428, § 5:48, at 466; see also Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 16.1, at
758 n.1; JAMES ET AL, supra note 72, § 10.20, at 642; 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.02, at 23-24.
prompted the United States Supreme Court to toll the statute of limitations
on federal claims held by absent class members for the period of time
between the filing of a class action complaint on their behalf and the denial
of class certification. Since the Court discussed these concerns in light of
the Rule 23 policies, it will be helpful to delineate those policies in
somewhat greater depth before turning to an analysis of the Court’s
decisions in American Pipe and Crown, Cork.
B.  Tolling in the Class Action Context
1.  The Rule 23 Policies
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the
filing of class actions by (or against) a named representative on behalf of
a larger group of similarly situated members, serves several important
objectives.  First, where the plaintiffs’ claims are large enough to justify70
individual lawsuits, Rule 23 fosters judicial economy and efficiency. By
providing a vehicle for the prosecution of many individual claims in a
single positive-value class action, Rule 23 avoids duplicative litigation,
thereby conserving judicial resources.  Of course, often the value of absent71
class members’ claims are so small that it would not make sense for them
to sue unless an aggregation vehicle like the class action were available.
With respect to such negative-value class actions, Rule 23 does not
conserve judicial resources at all but rather authorizes the filing of a class
action, the prosecution of which may consume significant resources
(whereas in the absence of the Rule, few if any lawsuits would be filed and
few if any judicial resources would be expended).72
Second, Rule 23 affords claimants access to the courts by providing a
vehicle whereby they may pool their resources and spread litigation costs
among a large group of claimants.  Typically the lawyer representing the73
class advances the costs of litigation and in the event the class recovers a
monetary award, these costs and the attorney’s fees are paid from the
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74. JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 10.20, at 642 (citing Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
472, 478 (1980)).
75. See Dam, supra note 72, at 53. Professor Dam notes that since class actions consume
significant judicial resources, a decision to certify a class (with the objective of compensating the
absent class members) may delay the resolution of other claims for compensation. Id.
76. 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 5:49, at 468; see also id. § 5:51, at 470-71; JAMES
ET AL., supra note 72, § 10.20, at 643-44.
77. Dam, supra note 72, at 54-56, 60-61; see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a class action has to be unwieldy indeed before it can be
pronounced an inferior alternative—no matter how massive the fraud or other wrongdoing that will
go unpunished if class treatment is denied—to no litigation at all”).
78. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 5:47, at 465; 5 MOORE, supra note 71,
§ 23.02, at 23-37.
79. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guarantee class members a right to opt out of the
class only if the class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). In classes
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), notice and the opportunity to opt out are in the court’s
discretion. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), 23(d)(2). In class actions where the relief sought is wholly
or predominately money damages, due process guarantees absent class members who are beyond
the court’s jurisdictional reach “an opportunity to remove [themselves] from the class by executing
and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). “[I]t is not clear whether due process guarantees a right to opt
out to class members who seek declaratory or injunctive relief, and if so, whether this protection
is enjoyed only by absent class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum state or by all
absent class members regardless of connection to the forum state.” RHONDA WASSERMAN,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 183
(2004).
80. See 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.02, at 23-38; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s
recovery.  Thus, the availability of the class action vehicle furthers an74
interest in compensating the victims of wrongdoing who otherwise would
lack the resources or incentive to sue individually.75
Third, Rule 23 not only provides access to the courts for those with
small claims, but it ensures that the substantive law underlying their claims
is enforced.  Without a class action vehicle, if absent class members could76
not afford to press their claims and if governmental agencies were unable
to enforce the underlying substantive law, then wrongdoers who violated
the law would not be sued, their unlawful conduct would not be deterred,
and the law they violated would not be enforced.77
Fourth, by combining all or many of the claims against the defendant
into a single proceeding, Rule 23 protects the defendant from the burden
of defending multiple lawsuits and from the risk of potentially inconsistent
judgments.78
Finally, Rule 23 attempts to balance these objectives with the due
process rights of the absent class members by providing procedural
fairness, including notice, the opportunity to opt out,  and other safeguards79
to ensure that the interests of the absent class members are adequately
protected.80
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note (1966 & 2003).
81. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974).
82. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351-54 (1983).
83. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 540; see also 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 17:19, at
366-67; 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.65[1][a]; 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1795, at 45-49 (3d ed. 2005).
84. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 540.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 540-41 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 541.
88. Id.
     2.  The Supreme Court’s Balance of the Statute of Limitations
Policies and the Rule 23 Policies
In American Pipe and Crown, Cork, the Supreme Court carefully
considered both the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies
to support its conclusion that the statute of limitations is tolled when absent
class members seek to intervene in an action denied class certification to
press their individual claims  or to file their own independent lawsuits81
upon denial of class certification.  An analysis of these cases and the82
Court’s policy discussions therein will guide our consideration of whether
the statute of limitations should likewise be tolled when absent class
members seek to press their claims in a successive class action once
certification in the initial class action has been denied.
a.  American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah (1974)
American Pipe involved a conspiracy to restrain trade in steel and
concrete pipe during the early 1960s.  The procedural history is somewhat83
complex. In 1964, the federal government filed criminal charges against
several individuals and corporations that sold concrete and steel pipe,
alleging that they had violated the Sherman Act.  The defendants entered84
pleas of nolo contendere, or no contest, and the court entered judgments of
guilt.  Shortly thereafter, the federal government filed a civil action85
against the same defendants seeking injunctive relief, and in 1968 the court
entered a consent decree “enjoining . . . future violations of the antitrust
laws.”86
Following this litigation by the federal government, in 1969 the state of
Utah filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah against some of the same defendants, claiming that they had
conspired to rig prices in violation of the Sherman Act.  Utah “purported87
to . . . represent [] [a class of] ‘public bodies and agencies [within] the
state . . . [that] acquired [pipe] from the defendants’” as well as other
western states that had not previously filed suit against the defendants.88
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89. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1974), quoted in Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 541-42.
90. In re Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 303 F. Supp. 507, 509 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
91. Id. at 508.
92. Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 20-21 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
93. Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 100-01 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff’d in part,
remanded in part, 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
94. Id. at 108.
95. Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 538
(1974) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)).
Utah’s action was timely (with eleven days to spare) because a
provision of the Clayton Act tolls the running of the four-year statute of
limitations during the pendency of “‘civil or criminal
proceeding[s] . . . instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or
punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, . . . and for one year
thereafter . . . .’”  In other words, the Clayton Act tolled the running of the89
statute of limitations for the period during which the federal government’s
criminal prosecution and civil injunctive action were pending.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred Utah’s action
to the United States District Court for the Central District of California,90
where many other lawsuits arising out of the same facts were pending.91
Ultimately, in December 1969, the district court denied class certification,
finding that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) was not met.92
Subsequently, more than sixty absent class members — “towns and cities,
and water and sewer districts in Utah”—moved to intervene in Utah’s
action.  The district court denied leave to intervene, concluding that the93
statute of limitations on the absent class members’ claims had run and had
not been tolled by the class action proceeding.  94
While agreeing that the absent class members “had no right to
interven[e] under Rule 24(a) since, as a practical matter, they would not be
affected by any potential recovery by Utah,”  the Ninth Circuit Court of95
Appeals concluded that the district court erred both in denying permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b) and in concluding that the statute of
limitations had not been tolled during the pendency of Utah’s purported
class action: 
[A]s to members of the class Utah purported to represent, and
whose claims it tendered to the court, suit was actually
commenced by Utah’s filing. . . . Suit having been
commenced by a filing of the complaint, members of the class
were safely in court and their claims protected against the bar
of [the statute of limitations] until, by order of the court, they
were ejected from the suit. The statute thus was tolled by
commencement of suit and did not again commence to run
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96. Id. at 584.
97. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
98. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1974).
99. Id. at 549-550.
100. Id. at 551.
101. Id. at 552-53 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 551 (stating that “no different a standard should apply to those members of the class
who did not rely upon the commencement of the class action (or who were even unaware that such
a suit existed) and thus cannot claim that they refrained from bringing timely motions for individual
intervention or joinder because of a belief that their interests would be represented in the class
suit”); see also Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985).
103. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553.
104. Id. at 554-55 (footnote omitted).
until entry of the order denying class action.96
The Supreme Court granted certiorari  and unanimously affirmed in an97
opinion by Justice Stewart.  After distinguishing between pre-196698
“‘spurious’” class actions and class actions certified under the modern Rule
23, the Court found “no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path of
holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint commences the
action for all members of the class as subsequently determined.”  The99
Court noted that if the filing of the class action were not deemed to satisfy
the statute of limitations for the absent class members, then the “principal
function” of the class action would be frustrated “because then the sole
means by which members of the class could assure their participation in
the judgment . . . would be to file . . . individual motions to join or
intervene as parties—precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23
was designed to avoid . . . .”  Thus, invoking one of the Rule 23 policies,100
the Court held that “at least where [certification is] denied solely [for] . . .
failure to [satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1)], the
commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for
all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene
after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status,”101
even those who previously were unaware of the existence of the class
action.  A contrary rule, the Court added, would frustrate the efficiency102
and judicial economy objectives of Rule 23.103
The Court considered the effect of this tolling rule on the policies
underlying the statute of limitations but concluded that the filing of the
class action complaint by the named representative before expiration of the
statute of limitations provided the defendant with “the essential
information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the
prospective litigation” regardless of whether the suit ultimately proceeded
as “a class action, as a joint suit or as a . . . suit with [multiple]
intervenors.”  The Court explained:104
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105. Id. (citation omitted); cf. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 7, at 536-37 (arguing that the
“inherent uncertainty regarding whether the second court will find the notice contained in the failed
class action to be adequate” will prompt class counsel “to file the [very] protective suits the
American Pipe class action tolling doctrine was created to avoid”). The lower federal courts have
cited the need to afford notice to the defendant in holding that a class action against one defendant
does not toll the statute of limitations on class members’ claims against a different defendant. See,
e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2005); Arneil v.
Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977); Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 132
F. Supp. 2d 506, 518-19 (N.D. Tex. 2001), aff’d w/o pub. op., 35 Fed. Appx. 390 (5th Cir. 2002).
106. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (stating that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right”).
108. Accord Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 7, at 548-49.
109. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1027 (1989);
Carrington, supra note 25, at 317-19; Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 7, at 546-68; Chardon v.
Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 664 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that “the source of the
[The] policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and
of barring a plaintiff who “has slept on his rights” are satisfied
when, as here, a named plaintiff who is found to be
representative of a class commences a suit and thereby
notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims
being brought against them, but also of the number and
generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may
participate in the judgment.105
Thus, the tolling rule would not frustrate the statute of limitations policies.
In his concurrence in American Pipe, Justice Blackmun emphasized the
need to protect the defendant from surprise. He suggested that following
denial of class certification, the district court should deny permission to
intervene to those who seek to press “claims for which [the defendant] has
received no prior notice.”  Again, we see express concern for one of the106
statute of limitations policies, providing repose for the defendant.
The Court did not squarely address whether Rule 23 itself supplies the
tolling rule announced in American Pipe or whether the tolling rule is a
federal common law rule. Nor did the opinion clearly state whether the
American Pipe tolling rule applies only to class actions presenting federal
law claims or to all class actions filed in federal court (even those
presenting state law claims). To the extent that the Court considered
whether tolling abridges or modifies a substantive right—a limitation
imposed by the Rules Enabling Act —the Court may have implied that107
Rule 23 itself supplies the tolling rule.  Since Rule 23 itself addresses108
neither limitations nor tolling directly, this conclusion is subject to
debate.109
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tolling rule applied by the Court was necessarily Rule 23”); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 796 (2005) (stating that “Rule
23 . . . is not an appropriate authority to look to for the type of robust interest in aggregate relief that
is necessary here”).
110. See Burbank, supra note 109, at 1016, 1032; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1083-87 (1982).
111. Carrington, supra note 25, at 316 (discussing Rule 3); cf. id. at 319 (concluding that
“nothing in the Rules Enabling Act” bars the American Pipe tolling rule).
112. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557-58 (1974).
113. Id. at 558 n.29 (citation omitted).
114. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1027-28 (footnotes omitted).
115. Id. at 1028 n.100 (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith
and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 774
(1986)).
116. I do not mean to suggest that the source of the American Pipe tolling rule—Rule 23 or
If Rule 23 is the source of the American Pipe tolling rule, then one may
ask whether it is consistent with the Rules Enabling Act. The legislative
history of the Act suggests that a Federal Rule regarding limitations of
actions would be beyond the scope of the Act.  Moreover, to the extent110
that the tolling rule lengthens the period of time during which a defendant
may be sued, it “strikes at the substantive heart of limitations policy.”111
The Court in American Pipe, however, disclaimed any violation of the
Rules Enabling Act: “The proper test is not whether a time limitation is
‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’ but whether tolling the limitation in a given
context is consonant with the legislative scheme.”  Given that the112
legislative history of the Clayton Act stated that its limitations period was
“strictly a procedural limitation,” the Court found no abridgement or
modification of a substantive right in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act.113
Even if Rule 23 does not supply the tolling rule, it nevertheless may
influence the content of a judicially-crafted common law rule. As Professor
Burbank has stated: 
Even though Rule 23 does not and could not validly provide
a tolling rule, in devising such a rule “not inconsistent with
the legislative purpose,” the Court was not required to ignore
the policies exogenous to limitations that animate Rule 23,
including in particular the policy against “multiplicity of
activity.”114
A footnote to this passage adds: “Even when legal regulation in a certain
area is forbidden to the Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may help
to shape valid federal common law.”  Thus, the Rule 23 policies animate115
the American Pipe tolling rule regardless of whether Rule 23 itself supplies
the tolling rule or the Court crafted it as federal common law.116
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federal common law—is irrelevant. In determining whether the American Pipe tolling rule governs
federal class actions presenting state law claims, the source of the tolling rule may influence the
analysis. See, e.g., Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1997) (viewing
the American Pipe tolling rule as “a judge-made practice,” not a Federal Rule); see also Lowenthal
& Feder, supra note 7.
117. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552-53.
118. 462 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1983); see also 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 17:19, at
367; 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.65[1][a] & n.2; 7B WRIGHT, supra note 83, § 1795, at 49-50.
119. Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 347.
120. Id. at 347-48.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (allowing a person ninety days, after the receipt of
a right-to-sue letter, in which to commence litigation). The Supreme Court had previously rejected
the argument that the ninety-day time limit is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be tolled or
waived. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982); Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811, 811 n.9 (1980).
122. Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 347.
123. Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 514 F. Supp. 122, 126 (D. Md. 1981), rev’d, 677 F.2d
391 (4th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
b.  Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker (1983)
While American Pipe made clear that the statute of limitations is tolled
for the benefit of absent class members who seek to intervene in the
litigation brought by the would-be representative,  it left open the117
question whether the statute also is tolled for the benefit of absent class
members who seek to file individual lawsuits following denial of class
certification. That issue was raised less than a decade later in Crown, Cork
& Seal Co. v. Parker.118
Crown, Cork involved an employment discrimination class action filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on behalf
of African Americans who were denied employment opportunities by
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. on the basis of race.  The district court denied119
the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class, concluding that the numerosity,
typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) were
not satisfied.120
Within ninety days  after the district court denied certification, but121
almost two years after he had received his right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC, Theodore Parker, an absent class member, filed a Title VII action
against Crown, Cork, alleging race discrimination in employment.  The122
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
holding “that the tolling rule of American Pipe is applicable only to Title
VII class members who seek intervention in the original suit,” not those
like Parker who seek to sue individually.  The United States Court of123
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, declining to “exalt form over
substance” and concluding that “American Pipe should be read to toll
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124. Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 462 U.S.
345 (1983).
125. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 459 U.S. 986 (1982).
126. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
127. Id. at 350-51.
128. Id. at 350.
129. Id.
130. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (addressing notice requirements in the class action context).
131. Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 351 (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 176 n.13). 
132. Id. at 352-53.
133. Id. at 353.
limitations with respect to a new suit as well as to a motion to
intervene.”124
The Supreme Court granted certiorari  and, in a unanimous opinion125
written by Justice Blackmun, affirmed.  The Court invoked the same Rule126
23 policy regarding efficiency and judicial economy that it had relied upon
in American Pipe: If the statute of limitations were not tolled during the
pendency of the class action:
[A] putative class member who fears that class certification
may be denied would have every incentive to file a separate
action prior to the expiration of his own period of limitations.
The result would be a needless multiplicity of
actions—precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and the tolling rule of American Pipe were
designed to avoid.127
The Court noted that absent class members might prefer to sue separately,
rather than seek to intervene as the absent class members in American Pipe
had.  Specifically, the Court believed that absent class members might128
find a different forum more convenient, or they might want personal
control over their suit (once the possibility of a class action was
eliminated), or they might worry that permission to intervene could be
denied.  The Court referred to an earlier opinion, Eisen v. Carlisle &129
Jacquelin,  where the Court had assumed that the American Pipe tolling130
rule would apply to individual lawsuits filed by absent class members who
opted out of a class action.131
As it had in American Pipe, the Court in Crown, Cork assured itself
that tolling in this context would not frustrate the statute of limitations
policies.  The class complaint itself would put the defendant on notice of132
the substantive claims against it, the number of potential plaintiffs, and
“the need to preserve evidence and witnesses”  that could help defend133
against the claims of all members of the class. “Tolling the statute of
limitations thus creates no potential for unfair surprise, regardless of the
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134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 355.
140. Id. at 354-55.
method class members choose to enforce their rights upon denial of class
certification.”  While recognizing that the number of individual lawsuits134
filed against a particular defendant might be reduced if the American Pipe
rule were limited to intervenors, the Court went on to note that “this
decrease in litigation would be counterbalanced by an increase in
protective filings in all class actions.”  Thus, to the extent that statutes of135
limitations are designed, in part, to reduce the volume of litigation, this
objective actually is furthered by tolling during the pendency of class
actions even for absent class members who choose to sue individually
when class certification is denied.
While noting that “a defendant may prefer not to defend against
multiple actions in multiple forums once a class has been decertified,” the
Court concluded that “this is not an interest that statutes of limitations are
designed to protect.”  Although protecting the defendant from multiple136
lawsuits is one of the Rule 23 policies, the Court apparently did not
consider it relevant to the tolling analysis once the possibility of a class
action had been ruled out.
In a concurring opinion in Crown, Cork, Justice Powell expressed
concern that the American Pipe tolling rule “is a generous one, inviting
abuse [because] [i]t preserves for class members a range of options
pending a decision on class certification.”  Justice Powell cautioned that137
“[t]he rule should not be read . . . as leaving a plaintiff free to raise
different or peripheral claims following denial of class status,”  but rather138
should permit the plaintiff to raise only the same claim that the would-be
class representative sought to raise in the context of the class action.  This139
limitation serves the statute of limitations policies by ensuring that the
earlier class action puts the defendant on notice of the substance of the
absent class member’s later individual action, before the statute of
limitations has run.140
3.  The Lower Courts’ Balance of the Statute of Limitations Policies
and the Rule 23 Policies
In determining whether to toll the statute of limitations in class actions
presenting procedural circumstances not considered by the Court in
American Pipe or Crown, Cork, the lower federal courts, too, have had to
balance the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies. We will
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141. Wood v. Combustion Eng’g., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. See, e.g., Realmonte v. Reeves, 169 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Adams Pub. Sch.
Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 718 n.1 (8th Cir. 1993); Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 519-20 (N.D. Tex. 2001), aff’d, 35 Fed. Appx. 390 (5th Cir. 2002); see
also Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 1983) (tolling the statute of
limitations where a class action was certified to resolve a “pattern or practice” discrimination claim
on a class-wide basis but the plaintiff pressed his individual claim separately), vacated for
reconsideration, 468 U.S. 1201 (1984), reinstated, 750 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1984); Brewton v. City
of Harvey, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125-27 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same). But see Chazen v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (declining to toll the statute of
limitations where “plaintiff consciously cho[se] not to participate in the class action”; it is unclear
whether the plaintiff opted out after certification or filed an individual suit before the certification
issue was decided); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp. 794, 804 (E.D. La.
1995) (questioning “whether under federal law the tolling benefits members of a federal class action
who opt out”), aff’d, 114 F.3d 66 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995 (1997); Pulley v.
Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D. Minn. 1983) (declining to toll the statute of
limitations “for individual actions brought by members of the class while the class still exists
[and] . . . for individual actions which are distinct from class claims”). See generally Michigan
Note, supra note 26, at 403-04 (arguing that “one who opts out of a class action should not benefit
from tolling for the time during which the individual was a class member”).
143. See, e.g., Ballen v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 23 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing
Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 354); cf. Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that “when certification has been granted, the statute begins running anew from the
date when the class member exercises the right to opt out”); 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.65[2]
(discussing tolling for members who opt out); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S MANUAL:
examine two different sets of circumstances addressed by the lower courts:
absent class members seeking to opt out and file individual lawsuits after
class certification has been granted, and absent class members filing
individual lawsuits before the district court has ruled on a motion for class
certification. Once we have a better understanding of how the lower courts
have balanced the statute of limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies
in these two scenarios, we will be in a better position to introduce the third
set of policies, the preclusion policies, that are relevant in the successive
class action context.
First, the lower federal courts have considered whether the American
Pipe tolling rule applies when absent class members choose to sue
separately after a class has been certified (either having opted out before
resolution of the class claims or by suing separately on individual claims
after the class has lost the liability phase of a pattern and practice class
action). Although “there appears to be a very real controversy as to
whether . . . American Pipe [extends] to situations in which a class action
member opts out and files separate suit,”  most of141
the federal courts addressing this issue have held that the American Pipe
tolling rule applies in this circumstance.  As a result, the statute of142
limitations is tolled from the date the class action is filed until the class
member opts out (or otherwise sues separately).143
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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14A.05, at 14A-20 (2005); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
83, § 1795, at 52 (stating that “the few courts that have addressed this issue have ruled that the
limitations statute is tolled until a class member opts out, when it begins running anew”).
144. Realmonte, 169 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553-54); see also Brewton,
285 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (drawing on Rule 23 policies).
145. See Edwards, 717 F.2d at 766 (stating that “[r]eliance on the pendency of a certified class
action is more reasonable than the reliance on an uncertified class action”); see also 5 MOORE,
supra note 71, § 23.65[2].
These decisions tolling the statute of limitations when a class member opts out following
certification are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). There, the Court considered the sufficiency of notice provided in a massive class
action. Id. at 172-80. The plaintiff argued that individual notice to the absent class members would
have been useless because none of them would have opted out and sued separately because the
statute of limitations already had run on their claims. Id. at 175-76, 176 n.13. The Eisen Court
rejected this argument, noting that “commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of
limitations as to all members of the class,” id. at 176 n.13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted),
including, the Court implied, those who opt out following certification. Id. at 176. The Supreme
Court in Crown, Cork read Eisen as “conclud[ing] that the right to opt out and press a separate
claim remained meaningful because the filing of the class action tolled the statute of limitations
under the rule of American Pipe.” Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 351-52.
146. Brewton, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27. A more complicated tolling issue arises when class
members exercise “back-end” opt-out rights at the settlement stage of a class action and file claims
at that time. See generally George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the
Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 258 (1996) (suggesting a new rule
Just as the Supreme Court in American Pipe considered the Rule 23
policies to support its conclusion that the statute of limitations is tolled
when absent class members intervene following a denial of certification,
the lower courts have invoked the Rule 23 policies to support their
conclusion that the limitations period is tolled when absent class members
opt out and sue separately following certification. Tolling in this context
“prevent[s] the ‘needless duplication of motions’ and protective filings by
parties seeking to preserve their rights . . . .”  In other words, if the statute144
of limitations were not tolled in these circumstances, class members would
have the incentive to sue separately even before a ruling on the certification
decision. Such a result would be at odds with the efficiency objectives of
Rule 23.  On the other hand, if the statute of limitations is tolled, class145
members do not have to file precautionary individual suits and instead can
wait to see whether the class is certified, retaining the (efficient) option of
continuing as absent class members. At least one district court that tolled
the statute of limitations on individual discrimination claims following a
defense verdict in a pattern or practice class action also noted that the
policies underlying the statute of limitations are not frustrated by tolling,
holding that the original class action put the defendants on notice of the
class members’ “claims against them, and [the] plaintiffs [could not] be
accused of sleeping on their rights when a class action was proceeding on
their behalf.”146
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allowing “(b)(3) class members [] the right to opt out at the settlement stage”). Likewise, unique
concerns arise when plaintiffs file a bilateral class action and defendant class members do not
receive actual notice of the filing of the class action until after the limitations period has run. See
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing
“the issue of tolling in the context of a class action suit in which there is a class of unnamed
defendants” and concluding that “‘effectuation of the purpose of litigative efficiency and economy,’
(which Rule 23 was designed to perform) transcends the policies of repose and certainty behind
statutes of limitations”).
147. See Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 569 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that “[t]he purposes of American Pipe tolling are not furthered when plaintiffs file
independent actions before decision on the issue of class certification”); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Nat’l Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 346 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that
American Pipe tolling was unavailable where the plaintiffs “filed their own action nine months
before the district court granted certification”).
148. See, e.g., Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 384 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Shaffer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02 C 1774, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20689, at *7, *9
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1149-50 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2003);
Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Prohaska v.
Sofamor, 138 F. Supp. 2d 422, 433 (W.D.N.Y. 2001);  Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F. Supp.
2d 793, 799-800 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Chinn v. Giant Food, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334-35 (D.
Md. 2000); Wahad v. City of New York, No. 75 Civ. 6203, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12323, at *20-
21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1999); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12534, at *32-33 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1998); Stutz v. Minn. Mining Mfg. Co.,
947 F. Supp. 399, 403-04 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Chemco, Inc. v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, No. 91
C 5041, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11657, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1992); Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Nat’l Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1011-12 (D.D.C. 1978), rev’d on other
grounds, 650 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that to hold otherwise and extend tolling
to plaintiffs’ separate action “would sanction duplicative suits and violate the policies behind
American Pipe”); see also Warren Consol. Sch. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 518 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (finding “no public policy reason” to extend tolling to the plaintiffs’ separate “stale
cause of action”). But see Amati v. City of Woodstock, No. 92 C 20347, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14281, at *15-17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997).
149. Supra note 148.
Second, the lower federal courts have considered whether the American
Pipe tolling rule applies when individuals file separate suits before the
district court rules on a motion to certify a class. The two federal Courts of
Appeals to have addressed this issue have concluded that the American
Pipe tolling rule does not apply in these circumstances.  Virtually all of147
the federal district courts that have addressed it agree.148
In declining to permit tolling in these circumstances, the lower courts
invoked the same Rule 23 policies relied upon by the Supreme Court in
American Pipe and Crown, Cork.  In American Pipe and Crown, Cork,149
the Court recognized that if the statute of limitations were not tolled, class
members would not be able to rely on the class action to protect their rights
and would have to file duplicative individual suits to protect their
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150. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 551; Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 350; see also
7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 1795, at 46; id. § 1800, at 263; cf. supra note 102 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of the tolling rule to class members who did not rely
on the pending class action).
151. See, e.g., Wahad, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12323, at *20; see also In re WorldCom, 294
F. Supp. 2d at 453 (concluding that “plaintiffs who choose . . . to pursue separate litigation may not
enjoy the benefits of [it] . . . without bearing its burdens . . . . [such as] the obligation to commence
their actions within the applicable statute of limitations”).
152. Wahad, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12323, at *20; accord In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d
at 451; Rahr, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
153. Shaffer, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20689, at *8 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12534, at *33).
154. Rahr, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (citing Wachovia, 461 F. Supp. at 1012). Another court
clarified that tolling “should not . . . appl[y] ‘when a plaintiff attempts to manipulate the rule in a
way that frustrates its underlying purpose.’” In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12534, at *33 (citing Stutz, 947 F. Supp. at 404).
interests.  Where the plaintiff chooses to file suit before the court rules150
on a motion to certify the class, however, she affirmatively evinces her
intent not to rely on the class action and therefore should not benefit from
the tolling rule.  Moreover, the plaintiff who sues separately rather than151
relying on the class action “create[s] the very inefficiency that American
Pipe sought to prevent—he generate[s] more litigation and expense
concerning the same issues that were litigated by a class of which he was
a member.”  Put differently, “plaintiffs who elect to individually pursue152
their own claims cannot ‘reap the benefits of a doctrine which is designed
for a group—the class and its putative members.’”153
Indeed, the lower courts have viewed as manipulative the efforts by
class members who file individual suits before certification and
nevertheless claim the benefits of the American Pipe tolling rule:
[T]he class action tolling doctrine is intended to avoid the
injustice and judicial inefficiency of requiring putative class
members to file individual suits or to lose their claims. It is
not intended to be a tool to manipulate limitations periods for
parties who, intending all along to pursue individual claims,
assert reliance on the proposed class action just long enough
to validate their otherwise time-barred claims.154
Realize, however, that opportunities for manipulation are not
eliminated by declining to toll the statute of limitations in these
circumstances. As one group of plaintiffs and amici in the WorldCom
litigation argued:
[W]ithout access to the American Pipe tolling doctrine,
institutions intending to file their own suits will simply
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155. In re Worldcom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (footnote omitted).
156. Id.
157. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 470-97 (2000)
(discussing other “problems that plague dueling class actions: duplication of effort, waste of judicial
resources, inordinate pressure on class counsel to settle and difficult preclusion problems”).
158. See id. at 484-97. For a discussion of the historical development of preclusion doctrine
in the class action context, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding
Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). For a discussion of the conflicts of interest
that may arise when applying preclusion doctrine to class actions (in the Title VII and tort contexts
forbear doing so until it is time to opt out of the
class. . . . [T]here will be a “bizarre gap” from the filing of a
class action until a decision on certification, and an
“onslaught of individual actions” by plaintiffs who wish to
preserve their right to pursue individual actions.155
Notwithstanding this argument, the district court concluded that a denial
of tolling in these circumstances would protect the courts from separate
lawsuits at least until after the certification decision was made, at which
point absent class members would be “in a far better position to evaluate
whether they wish to proceed with their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if
one has been certified.”156
The foregoing analysis of American Pipe and Crown, Cork
demonstrates that in deciding to toll the statute of limitations during the
pendency of a class action, the Supreme Court assured itself that tolling
would not frustrate the statute of limitations policies and would further the
Rule 23 policies regardless of whether absent class members intervened in
the class action to press their individual claims or filed independent actions
upon the denial of class certification. Likewise, lower federal court
decisions have applied the same sets of policies in deciding whether to toll
the statute of limitations when absent class members file individual actions
after a class has been certified or before a ruling on the certification
motion. Now we must consider whether the same policies justify the
tolling of the statute of limitations if absent class members seek to bring
another class action raising the same claims or if other considerations
complicate the analysis.
     IV.  THE THIRD RING: THE PRECLUSION POLICIES AND TOLLING IN
THE SUCCESSIVE CLASS ACTION CONTEXT
When absent class members seek to press their claims in the context of
a successive class action, several obstacles may impede their path,  two157
of which are salient here. First, preclusion doctrine may foreclose the
prosecution of their claims or the relitigation of issues decided against the
class in an earlier suit.  Second, the statute of limitations may bar their158
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in particular) and the extent to which rendering courts in class action litigation should attempt to
constrain the preclusive effects their judgments will have upon future litigation, see Wolff, supra
note 109. Wolff does not explore the preclusive effects, if any, of a denial of class certification.
159. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
160. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982) (citations omitted); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (discussing effects of merger or bar on
a claim); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.1, at 646 (defining res judicata); JAMES ET AL.,
supra note 72, § 11.2, at 674-75; id. § 11.16, at 702 (stating that a judgment need not be on the
merits to be preclusive as long as “the procedure in the first action afforded plaintiff a fair
opportunity to get to the merits”); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4402, at 7-9 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2005) (discussing res judicata terminology).
161. Supra note 160.
claims as untimely. If preclusion law forecloses successive class actions,
it is not necessary even to reach the statute of limitations question. Thus,
we will begin our analysis of successive class actions by examining the
policies underlying preclusion doctrine generally and the reasons why
preclusion doctrine often fails to preclude successive class actions
presenting the same claims.
Since successive class actions typically survive the preclusion doctrine
hurdle, we will then consider whether the American Pipe tolling doctrine
applies in the successive class action context. Regarding the tolling issue,
the Ninth Circuit noted that “[s]trictly speaking, this is not a statute of
limitations question at all. It is, rather, a question of whether plaintiffs
whose individual actions are not barred may be permitted to use a class
action to litigate those actions.”  Notwithstanding this insight, most of the159
lower courts handling these cases have characterized the issue as a tolling
question. In resolving it, not only have they invoked the statute of
limitations policies and the Rule 23 policies that informed the Supreme
Court’s analysis in American Pipe and Crown, Cork, but they also have
raised a number of policies underlying preclusion law. Thus,
notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the failure of preclusion doctrine
to forestall successive class actions, the lower courts have invoked some
of the policies underlying preclusion law to conclude that the statute of
limitations was not tolled and therefore that successive class actions were
time-barred.
A.  The Preclusion Policies
The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion determine the binding
effect of judgments. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, or “res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties
or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
in that action.”  The judgment forecloses further litigation of the same160
claim whether the plaintiff wins or loses.  If a “judgment is rendered in161
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162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (1982).
163. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.1, at 646; JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.3,
at 676; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4402, at 16-17.
164. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 n.6 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980));
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71,
§ 14.3, at 653-54; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 21, 24-25. But see 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 25 (questioning whether preclusion doctrine actually does much to
protect overworked courts).
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (1982); FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 71, § 14.1, at 646; JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.3, at 675-76; 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 160, § 4402, at 7-9.
166. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 94); Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S.
at 326; Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
claim preclusion “has at its fundamental base the vindication of private litigants’ interest in
repose”); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.3, at 653; JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.2,
at 675; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 26-30 (characterizing repose as the core value
of preclusion doctrine).
167. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 26 n.10 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971) (noting that a plaintiff that sought to relitigate
a claim it lost in an earlier suit “is expending funds on litigation” to press a claim “which is by
hypothesis invalid. These moneys could be put to better use . . . .”).
favor of the plaintiff[,] [t]he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action
on the original claim or any part thereof. . . .”  Put differently, the162
plaintiff cannot split her claim, pursuing part of it in one lawsuit and the
rest of it in another suit; the entire claim merges into the judgment
rendered in the first action.  This aspect of claim preclusion doctrine,163
referred to as merger, provides the plaintiff with a powerful incentive to
present her entire claim in a single lawsuit, thereby promoting efficiency
and judicial economy.  Thus, to the extent that both preclusion doctrine164
and Rule 23 seek to promote efficiency and judicial economy, they overlap
in their policy objectives.
If a judgment is rendered against the plaintiff, claim preclusion bars her
from bringing another action on the same claim.  Thus, a losing plaintiff165
cannot sue the defendant again and again, each time hoping for another
chance to prevail. This aspect of claim preclusion doctrine, referred to as
bar, not only conserves judicial resources, but, by mandating finality and
repose, also protects the defendant from the burden, cost and vexation of
relitigating the same claim.  To the extent that both preclusion doctrine166
and statutes of limitations seek to provide the defendant with repose, they
also overlap in their policy objectives.
Claim preclusion serves several objectives in addition to the primary
policies of efficiency and repose for the defendant. It protects the
unsuccessful plaintiff “against his own folly in risking a second try.”167
Claim preclusion also serves a broader public interest in stability and
repose. “In some cases, the public at large also has an interest in seeing that
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168. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.3, at 654.
169. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 94); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 71, § 14.3, at 653-54; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 23-24.
170. JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.3, at 675.
171. For a statement of the circumstances in which a party may be precluded from relitigating
an issue vis-à-vis a nonparty, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). See also
Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329-30 (distinguishing between offensive and defensive nonmutual
collateral estoppel); JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.25; 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464 at 692-713 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2005) (discussing
the evolution of nonmutual issue preclusion).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467
n.6 (explaining collateral estoppel); JAMES ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.3, at 676 (exlpaining “[t]he
effect of issue preclusion”); id. § 11.17, at 703 (stating that “even though [a later action] involves
a different claim or cause of action[,]” issue preclusion may affect the later action); 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 160, § 4402, at 9 (explaining that issue preclusion “effectuate[s] the public policy
in favor of minimizing redundant litigation”); id. § 4416, at 390-93 (discussing the requirements
of issue preclusion). The term issue preclusion encompasses both direct and collateral estoppel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. b (1982). “Issue preclusion in a second action
on the same claim is sometimes [referred to] as direct estoppel” while issue preclusion in a “second
action brought on a different claim . . . is [referred to] as collateral estoppel.” Id.; see also
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.1, at 646-47 (discussing the two types of estoppel); 18
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4416, at 393 (explaining the two types of estoppel).
173. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 30; 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171,
§ 4464, at 710-11. 
174. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329-30 (stating that “defensive collateral estoppel
gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible”).
rights and liabilities once established remained fixed. If a court quiets title
to land, for example, everyone should be able to rely on the finality of that
determination.”  And claim preclusion fosters consistency of results by168
precluding relitigation of claims,  thereby preserving “the moral force169
of . . . judgments. . . . ”  170
The doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, precludes
relitigation by the same party  of issues that were “actually litigated and171
determined by a valid and final judgment” and were necessary to support
the judgment.  Thus, even where claim preclusion does not foreclose a172
second suit, issue preclusion may preclude relitigation of issues that
actually were decided in the first action. To some extent, like claim
preclusion, issue preclusion promotes efficiency and judicial economy by
barring relitigation of issues already determined, thereby shortening the
length of trials, and encouraging plaintiffs to join multiple defendants in
a single lawsuit.  Because nonmutual defensive issue preclusion173
precludes a plaintiff from relitigating an issue that she previously lost in a
prior suit against a different defendant, the plaintiff has an incentive to sue
both defendants together.  To the extent, however, that parties can174
anticipate the future consequences of judicial resolution of an issue, issue
preclusion may create an incentive for “exhaustive litigation,” thereby
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175. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4416, at 400; see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 72,
§ 11.18, at 704-05; 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4464, at 712.
176. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 30 (noting that “nonparties breathe freer”);
18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4464, at 711 (noting that “[t]he vital need to foster repose
and reliance on judgments that supports general preclusion doctrine is greatly diluted in addressing
nonmutual issue preclusion”).
177. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, at 23; see also id. § 4416, at 393 (stating that
issue “preclusion prevents the risk of the clearest and most embarrassing inconsistencies”); 18A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4464, at 710 (same argument for nonmutual issue preclusion).
178. See, e.g., Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing 78 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4403, for the same proposition).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
180. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.3, at 655-56; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
160, § 4405, at 83.
181. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4405, at 85 (quoting Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
182. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 71, § 14.3, at 655, 655 n.10; 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 160, § 4405, at 85-86.
frustrating this efficiency objective.  Put differently, parties may spend175
more time, energy, and money litigating an issue than the current litigation
merits because they fear that the determination will be binding upon them
in later litigation where more will be at stake.
In addition to promoting judicial economy in at least some cases, issue
preclusion affords repose to a party that already litigated an issue (and, in
cases of nonmutual defensive issue preclusion, even to a nonparty who
never litigated an issue).176
More importantly, issue preclusion seeks to “preserv[e] the
acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect
that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent
results.”  Put differently, by eliminating opportunities to relitigate issues177
that already were decided, issue preclusion reduces the risk of inconsistent
results and the concomitant risk that citizens would lose confidence in the
integrity and efficacy of the judicial process.178
Issue and claim preclusion are affirmative defenses that may be raised
by the defendant in its answer.  If the defendant fails to raise the defense,179
it is waived.  “The waiver principle ‘suggests that the needs of judicial180
administration are, at best, of subsidiary value’ in justifying the rules of
preclusion.”  Ordinarily the court will not raise preclusion sua sponte,181
although in recent years, as courts have faced greater docket pressure and
have evinced a heightened interest in judicial economy, some courts have
raised the preclusion issue on their own motion.182
Before considering the extent to which preclusion policies affect the
tolling analysis in the successive class action context, one must first
understand why a decision denying class certification ordinarily does not
preclude a successive class action. 
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183. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4402, at 20; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982) (identifying valid and final judgments that do not bar another action by
the plaintiff on the same claim).
184. See, e.g., Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1019 n.9 (8th Cir. 2002)
(“recogniz[ing] that denial of class certification alone does not constitute a final judgment on the
merits sufficient to satisfy the res judicata principles underlying the relitigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act”) (citations omitted); Waltrip v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 128, 133 (Kan. 1984)
(stating that “[t]he determination that the proposed class . . . would not be certified as a class was
tantamount to a dismissal otherwise than on the merits at to these plaintiffs”); cf. Guenter v. Lomas
& Nettleton Co., 189 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that “the denial of class
certification . . . was on the merits” and therefore “was an appealable order”).
185. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4402, at 20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 13 cmt. d, 20 cmt. b (1982); see, e.g., Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189,
1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that even though the prior dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was not on the merits and did not have claim preclusive effect, it did have issue
preclusive effect and precluded relitigation of the amount in controversy).
      B.  The Application of Preclusion Doctrine in the      
Successive Class Action Context
If a decision denying class certification had claim preclusive effect, it
would bar absent class members from pursuing their claims in a second
lawsuit, either individually or as part of a successive class action even if
there were no statute of limitations issues. Intuitively, such a result seems
unfair because the would-be representative never presented the substantive
claims of the absent class members for adjudication and never even had an
opportunity to do so. Preclusion doctrine accommodates this intuitive
reaction by according claim preclusive effect only to final judgments that
are “‘on the merits.’”  Although few judicial opinions expressly address183
the claim preclusive effect of a decision denying class certification, it is
clear that denials of class certification do not adjudicate the underlying
merits of the class members’ claims and have no claim preclusive effect.184
Thus, denials of class certification do not preclude absent class members
from suing on the claims raised in the class action complaint, either
individually or in the context of another class action.
Judgments that lack claim preclusive effect because they are not “‘on
the merits’” nevertheless may have issue preclusive effect and therefore
may preclude the parties from relitigating issues already adjudicated.185
Thus, we must consider whether a decision denying class certification bars
absent class members from relitigating issues decided against the class in
the earlier action, such as a lack of numerosity or the unmanageability of
the class action. If denials of class certification are accorded issue
preclusive effect, then successive class actions essentially are precluded
because no court may certify a class unless all of the statutory requirements
(such as numerosity and adequacy of representation) are satisfied.
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186. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798-99 (1996) (quoting Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); see also 18A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4449, at 330 (stating the basic premise that only parties to prior
action are bound); Wasserman, supra note 157, at 484-85 (same).
187. See, e.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41-43 (explaining the general rule when absent class
members may be bound). See generally 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4455 (discussing
preclusion in the class action context).
188. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2004); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2003).
189. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69 (holding that absent class members were
bound by a denial of class certification where the rendering court had found that the class
representatives and their attorneys furnished adequate representation); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.10 cmt. c (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 2005) (stating that “[a] mere
cosmetic change in the proposed class representative . . . should not defeat same-party status where
the class for which certification is now being sought is the same as the one for which class
Examined solely as a policy matter, one might expect that a denial of
class certification would preclude a successive class action filed on behalf
of the same class. After all, if one court already has decided that the action
cannot be presented on behalf of a class, it seems (at least at first blush)
inefficient and wasteful to ask another court to decide the same question
again. Moreover, it seems unfair to compel the defendant to incur the cost
and hassle of defending against another class action when it already has
convinced one court that class treatment is inappropriate. And permitting
relitigation of the certification question runs the risk that the second court
may decide the issue differently, causing the public to lose confidence in
the integrity and accuracy of judicial decisions.
Even though it appears that the policies underlying preclusion law
might well be served by a decision to preclude a successive class action,
in fact, the hurdle posed by issue preclusion doctrine to successive class
actions is more illusory than real. Let us understand why issue preclusion
is not likely to bar the prosecution of a second class action following denial
of class certification.
First, ordinarily, only parties to a prior suit or their privies are bound by
a judgment against them.  The Supreme Court has held that absent class186
members may be bound by a class action judgment, but only when the
named representative has been adequately representing their interests.187
Thus, if the class counsel or putative representative in the suit in which
class certification was denied was not adequately representing the absent
class members, then the absent class members could not be bound by the
judgment.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re188
Bridgestone/Firestone held that if the rendering court found the
representation to be adequate, but declined to certify a class for other
reasons, the absent class members would be bound by the ruling and
precluded from bringing a successive class action.  This conclusion189
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certification was previously denied . . .”).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e) & cmt. e (1982).
191. See, e.g., Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 879-82 (6th Cir. 1997);
Roberts v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1975); Furey v. Geriatric & Med.
Ctrs., Inc., Civil Action No. 92-5113, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10299, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1993)
(stating that “[t]he fact that the plaintiffs named in that complaint have been precluded from seeking
recovery on behalf of the putative class does not—indeed, could not lawfully—preclude other
members of the class from bringing an action on behalf of the class”); see also 18A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 171, § 4455, at 458; Wasserman, supra note 157, at 484-85. 
192. See, e.g., Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1019 n.9 (8th Cir. 2002)); In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating that “denial of class certification . . . lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive
effect”); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996) (similar);
Wethington v. Purdue Pharma LP, 218 F.R.D. 577, 583 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Carter v. Gen’l Motors
Corp., No. 7:99-CV-230-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 581, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2001); Yasgur
v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., 98-CV-121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20989, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Mar. 9, 1999);
Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1994); see also 18A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 171, § 4455, at 458; Wasserman, supra note 157, at 484-85.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. a (1982).
194. Id. § 13; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.10 cmt. c
(Prelim. Draft No. 3, 2005) (stating that “[t]he court in a subsequent proceeding . . . should consider
whether the earlier denial of aggregate treatment is sufficiently definite as to warrant issue-
preclusive effect”); 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4434 (describing a more relaxed and
“practical view of finality” adopted by some courts).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. g (1982).
196. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767 (holding that an appellate court’s decision
that no nationwide class could be certified was sufficiently final for purposes of issue preclusion);
appears to conflict with the Second Restatement of Judgments: Since class
representatives are authorized to represent the absent class members only
if the court in fact certifies a class,  absent class members may not be190
bound by an order denying class certification.191
Second, even if the successive class action were brought by the same
putative class representative and even if she would be bound by a decision
rendered against her, an order denying class certification might lack the
requisite finality to be given preclusive effect in a second class action.192
A judgment that is “merely tentative in the very action in which it was
rendered” is not to be given preclusive effect in a subsequent action.193
According to the Second Restatement of Judgments, a prior adjudication
is deemed a final judgment if it “is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect.”  Factors that support a conclusion of finality194
include “that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its
decision with a reasoned opinion, [and] that the decision was subject to
appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal. . . .”  Applying these factors,195
some courts, including the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone/Firestone, have
held that denials of class certification are “‘sufficiently firm’” for purposes
of issue preclusion.196
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see also Rehoreg v. Stoneco, Inc., No. 04CA008481, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 5, 2005).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
198. See, e.g., J.R. Clearwater, 93 F.3d at 179 n.2; Morgan, 889 S.W.2d at 367.
199. In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219-20 (8th Cir. 1977);
cf. In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Va. 1985); see also
18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4455, at 458 (noting that “a denial of certification may not
be sufficiently ‘final’ to support preclusion”).
200. See, e.g., Yasgur v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., 98-CV-121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20989, at
*8 (D. Minn. 1999) (declining to apply issue preclusion because the definitions of the putative
classes were not identical).
201. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1987); cf. Canady v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding procedural differences irrelevant).
202. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4455, at 457-58 & n.13; see also Oshana v. Coca-
Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 579 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Wasserman, supra note 157, at 485-86 (discussing
the effect of different issues and standards); cf. Scarvey v. First Fed’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98-CVS
204, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 2, *10-17 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2000) (finding that the claims in both
actions were identical). See generally Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1114 n.206 (1996) (explaining that a denial of certification in one
court generally has “no collateral estoppel effect on the ability of a second court in a different
jurisdiction to consider certifying the class”).
203. See, e.g., Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 367-68 (Tex. App. 1994)
(noting the different application of the same rules in the state and federal systems); see also
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.10(a) cmt. b & illus. 1 (Prelim. Draft No.
3, 2005); Wasserman, supra note 157, at 486.
Not all courts and commentators agree. According to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an order determining whether to certify
a class action “may be altered or amended before final judgment.”197
Courts have cited this language in support of the conclusion that denials of
class certification are not sufficiently final to be accorded issue preclusive
effect, at least where the underlying action is not dismissed upon the denial
of class certification.  But even where the putative representative198
voluntarily dismisses the action following the denial of certification, the
judgment may lack the requisite finality to be given preclusive effect.199
Finally, since issue preclusion bars relitigation only of the identical
issue previously litigated, the class representative would not be precluded
from relitigating the propriety of class certification in a second putative
class action if the size or definition of the class presented in the second
action were different,  or if the standards for certification under the200
governing procedural rules of the first and second courts were different,201
or if for some other reason the issue raised in the second class action were
not the same as the issue decided in the first.  Even if the language of the202
two rules was identical, if the courts were in different systems—e.g., if the
first court was a state court and second court is a federal court—the two
systems might interpret the same language in their procedural rules
differently.203
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204. See Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1998); Griffin v. Singletary,
17 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1988); Korwek
v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 876-79 (2d Cir. 1987) (narrow class certified); Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio
Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Robbin v. Fluor Corp., 835
F.2d 213, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1987); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v INS (CSS VI), 232 F.3d 1139, 1147
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating, in dicta, that “if plaintiffs [in a class action sought] to relitigate
the correctness of [a] denial” of certification in an earlier class action, “we would not permit
plaintiffs to bring a class action”). See generally 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 1795, at 51-52
(discussing the barring of successive class actions); 5 MOORE, supra note 71, § 23.65[1][b]
(discussing the lack of tolling for successive class actions where certification is denied).
     C.  Tolling in the Successive Class Action Context: The Lower
Courts’ Balance of the Three Sets of Policies
As Part IV.B demonstrated, the decision by a trial court declining to
certify a class is not likely to preclude absent class members from filing a
second class action on behalf of the same class pressing the same claim. If,
however, months or years pass between the filing of the first class action
complaint and the denial of class certification, the defendant may raise the
statute of limitations as a defense when an absent class member files a
complaint in a second class action. Thus, if preclusion doctrine fails to bar
the filing of successive class actions, then the application of the American
Pipe tolling rule is squarely presented: If, following a denial of class
certification, the statute of limitations is tolled for absent class members
who seek to intervene in the original class action, and if it is tolled for
absent class members who seek to file individual lawsuits to press their
claims, is the statute of limitations also tolled for absent class members
who seek to press their claims in the context of a successive class action?
Let us begin by analyzing how the lower federal courts have addressed this
issue, and then, in Part V, we will consider how the three sets of relevant
policies—the statute of limitations policies, the Rule 23 policies, and the
preclusion policies—should influence analysis of this issue.
1.  The Majority View: No Tolling
Most of the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue,
including the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, have held
that the statute of limitations is not tolled for a putative class representative
who seeks to bring a successive class action upon the denial of class
certification in an initial class action (or upon the certification of a narrow
class, followed by the filing of a successive class action on behalf of a
broader class that was denied certification in the initial action).  In204
support of this conclusion, the Courts of Appeals have invoked three policy
concerns. First, they have raised the policy of repose, which underlies both
the statute of limitations and preclusion doctrine: If class members in
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205. Basch, 139 F.3d at 11; Salazar-Calderon, 765 F.2d at 1351.
206. Basch, 139 F.3d at 11; see also Andrews v. Orr, 614 F. Supp. 689, 692 (S.D. Ohio 1985),
vacated on other grounds, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988).
207. See CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1154-55 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the defendant’s
interest in repose); Griffin, 17 F.3d at 359 (bemoaning the possibility of “endless rounds of
litigation”).
208. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1154 (footnote omitted) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
209. See Korwek, 827 F.2d at 879 (distinguishing a “motion for amendment under Rule
23(c)(1), . . . which protects scarce administrative resources while ensuring” an opportunity to
revisit the certification question).
210. Id.
211. Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring), quoted in Basch v. Ground
Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 1998); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988);
successive class actions were to receive the benefit of the American Pipe
tolling rule, then the statute of limitations would be tolled “indefinitely”205
or “perpetually”  and the defendant would be denied the repose promised206
by the statute of limitations.  In other words, if successive class actions207
were deemed timely due to application of the American Pipe tolling rule,
the defendant would have to defend against repetitive class actions and
worry about its potential liability for an even longer—indeed
indeterminate—period of time. Such tolling would “extend [] the statute
of limitations beyond the wildest dreams of those who enacted it.”208
Second, at least one Court of Appeals raised concerns about judicial
economy—concerns that underlie both Rule 23 and preclusion doctrine.
The Second Circuit suggested that successive class actions would consume
scarce judicial resources,  while a decision declining to toll the statute of209
limitations in a successive class action arguably would conserve them.
Third, the same court expressed concern that tolling might engender a
lack of respect for prior judicial decisions, one of the policy concerns
underlying preclusion law. For example, if a court denied certification
because it concluded that a class action would be unmanageable, a decision
to toll the statute of limitations in a later-filed class action brought on
behalf of the same class and raising the same claim would “afford plaintiffs
the opportunity to argue and reargue the question of class certification by
filing new but repetitive complaints.”  Such reargument would invite a210
decision at odds with the first decision denying certification. Thus, by
declining to toll the statute of limitations in the successive class action
context, courts seek to foster respect for prior decisions.
In addition to invoking the three sets of policies that we have
highlighted, the federal Courts of Appeals have expressed concern that
application of the American Pipe tolling rule in the successive class action
context would invite abuse. They quote from Justice Powell’s concurrence
in Crown, Cork, where he noted that the American Pipe tolling rule “‘is a
generous one, inviting abuse’”  or they label tolling in the successive211
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Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985). See also
Fleming v. Bank of Boston Corp., 127 F.R.D. 30, 36 (D. Mass. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Fleming v.
Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1990).
212. Robbin, 835 F.2d at 214 (quoting Korwek, 827 F.2d at 879).
213. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1147 (en banc) (citing Robbin, 835 F.2d at 214).
214. See Hunter v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (D.S.C.
2005) (declining to extend tolling where the earlier class action “voluntarily narrow[ed] . . . the
class definition”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 219-21
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding, in dicta, that tolling would not extend to a successive class action);
Vinson v. Seven Seventeen HB Phil. Corp., No. 00-6334, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25295, at *26
(E.D. Pa. 2001); Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, Civ. Action No. 96-25J, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16194, at *24 n.9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998) (dicta); In re Westinghouse Secs. Litig., 982
F. Supp. 1031, 1033-35 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303,
311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Cypress Semiconductor Secs. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 957, 959 (N.D.
Cal. 1994); Smith v. Flagship Int’l, 609 F. Supp. 58, 63-64 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Burns v. Ersek, 591
F. Supp. 837, 840-41 (D. Minn. 1984); see also Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 85 Civ.
8428, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25691, at *7-15 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986) (holding that the statute of
limitations was not tolled in the successive fund shareholder’s action context); 5 CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 16:11, at 186.
215. See, e.g., Vinson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25295, at *25 (refusing to condone “abusive
tactics”); In re Westinghouse, 982 F. Supp. at 1034 (declining to “permit . . . abusive
manipulations”); In re Cypress, 864 F. Supp. at 959 (discussing “needless, ‘abusive’ litigation”)
(quoting Korwek, 827 F.2d at 879); id. at 960 (viewing second class action as “an attempt to
circumvent a court order”); Smith, 609 F. Supp. at 64 (discussing “potentially endless succession
of class actions”); Burns, 591 F. Supp. at 840, 842 (expressing concern over the “perpetual tolling”
of class claims).
216. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 346 (1983) (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
219. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 221; Smith, 609 F. Supp. at 63-64
(citations omitted); Burns, 591 F. Supp. at 841 (citations omitted).
class action context as “‘abusive.’”  In a similar vein, one court expressed212
concern about litigants’ efforts to “circumvent” earlier rulings.213
Like the holdings of the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth,
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, several district courts have held that the
statute of limitations is not tolled in the successive class action context.214
In addition to the policy concerns discussed above,  the district courts215
have relied upon language in Crown, Cork—which discussed the
availability of tolling when absent class members “file individual
actions”  or “separate suits”  in “multiple forums” —to support the216 217 218
conclusion that tolling is unavailable in the successive class action
context.219
2.  The Minority View: Tolling in Limited Circumstances
Two of the federal Courts of Appeals, the Third and Ninth Circuits,
have permitted tolling in sequential class actions in limited
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220. In addition, an early Second Circuit opinion assumed sub silentio that the American Pipe
tolling rule applies in the successive class action context. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 719-
21 (2d Cir. 1987). But the court later disavowed that ruling, noting that “a sub silentio holding ‘is
not binding precedent’ . . . .” Korwek, 827 F.2d at 877 (citation omitted).
221. CSS VI, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Recent Case, Civil
Procedure—Class Actions—Ninth Circuit Holds That Prior Class Action Tolled the Statute of
Limitations for New Class Action Claim, Catholic Soc. Servs. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2576, 2576 (2001) (criticizing the court’s “particularistic
pragmatism” as providing “an unsatisfactory analytical alternative to guide future decisions”); 2
CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 71, § 6:3, at 491-93.
222. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1147 (citation omitted); accord Robbin, 835 F.2d at 214.
223. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1149.
224. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Meese (CSS I), 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
225. Id. at 1159-60.
226. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Thornburgh (CSS II), 956 F.2d 914, 923 (9th Cir. 1992),
vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. (CSS III), 509 U.S. 43, 67 (1993).
227. CSS III, 509 U.S. 43, 59 & 67 (1993).
228. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Reno (CSS IV), 134 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam).
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(c) (2000); see also CSS IV, 134 F.3d at 923-26.
230. CSS IV, 134 F.3d at 928.
231. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1144. Although the court’s opinion is not crystal clear on this point,
it appears that the named representatives in the second class action were different from the named
circumstances.  In Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. INS,  the Ninth220 221
Circuit sitting en banc adhered to its earlier position that the statute of
limitations is not tolled “when the second [class] action is no more than an
attempt to relitigate the correctness of the earlier class certification
decision”;  but on the unusual facts presented, it held that class members222
in a successive class action could invoke the American Pipe tolling rule.223
The case has a long and complicated history. In 1988, the district court
certified a class of aliens who sought to challenge an INS policy as being
inconsistent with a federal immigration statute.  The court concluded that224
the INS policy was unenforceable and granted relief to the class.  The225
Ninth Circuit affirmed.  On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court226
questioned the ripeness of the claims and vacated the judgment.227
On remand, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and the district
court certified a narrower class whose claims were ripe and granted relief
to the class.  While an appeal from this order was pending, Congress228
passed a law that denied jurisdiction over the claims of the class
representatives.  The Court of Appeals thereafter vacated the district229
court’s orders and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.230
Less than a month later, plaintiffs filed a second class action on behalf
of two groups of aliens: those whose claims were subject to jurisdiction
under the new federal statute and those whose claims did not satisfy the
statute but who challenged its constitutionality.  The district court231
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
846 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
representatives in the first class action.
232. Id. at 1144-45.
233. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS (CSS V), 182 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), modified
en banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
234. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1145.
235. Id. at 1147.
236. Id. at 1149.
237. Id.
239. Id.
certified a class of aliens whose claims were subject to jurisdiction under
the new statute and concluded that the governing “statute of limitations had
been tolled during the pendency of the [first] class action.”  On appeal232
from an order granting relief to the class, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the claims presented in the second class action were
time-barred and rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that “this second class
action [was] not an ‘abusive’ attempt to reargue the denial of class
certification.”  The full court voted to hear the case en banc.233 234
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit picked up on the plaintiffs’ argument,
noting that the statute of limitations would not have been tolled if the court
in the first action had denied certification and the class representatives in
the second action merely sought to relitigate the correctness of that
decision.  Thus, like the Courts of Appeals that denied tolling, the Ninth235
Circuit acknowledged the preclusion policies. But here, the court noted that
the classes in the earlier action had been properly certified and had been
narrowed “for reasons unrelated to Rule 23 certification.”  The plaintiffs236
in the second class action “d[id] not seek to cure any procedural
deficiencies in the classes under Rule 23 certified in the first action
because there were none.”  On these unusual facts, the court concluded237
that the statute of limitations on the claims presented in the second class
action were tolled during the pendency of the first class action:
We hold that under the doctrine of American Pipe and Crown,
Cork & Seal the statute of limitations was tolled during the
pendency of the first class action for the class members and
would-be class members in the action now before us, and that
plaintiffs in this case may aggregate their individual actions
into a class action. Plaintiffs in this case are not attempting to
relitigate an earlier denial of class certification, or to correct
a procedural deficiency in an earlier would-be class. Both the
class members challenging the [INS] . . . policy as
inconsistent with [the federal immigration statute] and the
would-be class members challenging [the statute that limited
jurisdiction] . . . were members of the classes certified in the
earlier action.239
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240. 392 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005).
241. Id. at 99-100.
242. Id. at 100.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 108-11; see also Yang v. Odom, 265 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471 (D.N.J. 2003), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part,  392 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005).
245. Yang, 392 F.3d at 100.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 100-01; see Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994).
248. Yang, 392 F.3d at 101.
249. Id. at 103-04.
250. Id. at 104.
The Third Circuit, too, has concluded that the statute of limitations may
be tolled for successive class actions. The procedural history of Yang v.
Odom  is less complicated than Catholic Social Services and the fact240
pattern is a more common one. Yang involved consolidated class actions
filed against World Access, Inc. (WAXS) and several of its former
managers and directors in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.  The consolidated amended complaint identified241
three subclasses: those who acquired their WAXS stock (1) on the open
market; (2) in connection with the Telco merger; and (3) in connection
with the NACT merger.  The district court appointed lead plaintiffs to242
represent each of the three subclasses.  It later denied their joint motion243
for class certification with prejudice, concluding that the putative class
representatives for the first two of the subclasses would not adequately
represent the interests of those subclasses and failed the typicality
requirement, and that the third subclass failed the numerosity
requirement.  The Eleventh Circuit declined interlocutory review.244 245
Several months later, three new plaintiffs (each a member of one of the
subclasses in the first class action) filed a “substantively identical” class
action in the District Court of New Jersey against the same defendants.246
The plaintiffs acknowledged that they might have sought to intervene as
new representatives in the Georgia litigation, but they had declined to do
so because they believed the Eleventh Circuit would not have tolled the
statute of limitations in those circumstances.  The district court in New247
Jersey dismissed the class complaint, concluding that the class claims were
time-barred.248
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed in part, framing the question as
“the extent to which the suits contemplated in Crown, Cork & Seal—i.e.,
those brought by individuals following a denial of class certification—can
be aggregated in a subsequent substantively identical class action.”  In249
approaching this question, the court focused on the reason the trial court
in the first action denied class certification.  Distinguishing between250
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251. Id. at 104. The court drew upon its prior “new representative” cases: McKowan Lowe &
Co. v. Jasmine Ltd., 295 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2002); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083
(3rd Cir. 1975). Yang, 392 F.3d at 104 & n.5; see also supra note 7.
252. Yang, 392 F.3d at 104.
253. McKowan Lowe Comment, supra note 7, at 2234 (calling these Rule 23 requirements
“‘claim specific’”).
254. Yang, 392 F.3d at 105.
255. Id. at 105-06 (discussing Griffin, 17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994)).
256. Id. at 106. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s distinction between Rule 23’s
“representative-specific” and “claim-specific” requirements as well as the differing approaches
taken by the Third Circuit, on the one hand, and the Second and Eleventh Circuits, on the other,
see McKowan Lowe Comment, supra note 7, at 2233-34; see also 5 MOORE, supra note 71,
§ 23.65[1][c], at 23-325 (concluding that the anti-stacking rule “makes sense when the initial denial
problems with the class—such as a lack of numerosity—and problems with
the putative representative—such as a lack of typicality—the court held
that:
American Pipe tolling applies to would-be class members
who file a class action following the denial of class
certification due to Rule 23 deficiencies of the class
representative. American Pipe tolling will not apply to
sequential class actions where the earlier denial of
certification was based on a Rule 23 defect in the class
itself.251
Reviewing the case law in the other circuits, the Third Circuit agreed
with the “unanimous” view that plaintiffs may not benefit from American
Pipe tolling in the successive class action context where the court in the
first class action denied certification due to “a Rule 23 deficiency in the
class itself,”  such as a lack of numerosity or a failure of the common252
questions to predominate over the individual questions.253
The Third Circuit, however, distinguished cases in which the first court
denied certification due to a “deficiency of the lead plaintiff as class
representative. . . .”  Noting that the Eleventh Circuit bars tolling in all254
successive class actions, even where certification of the first action is
denied because of a problem with the named representative,  the Third255
Circuit rejected this approach as inconsistent with the Rule 23 policies.
 
Given that American Pipe tolling would unquestionably apply
were the plaintiffs here to bring individual actions, it would
be at odds with the policy undergirding the class action
device, as stated by the Supreme Court, to deny plaintiffs the
benefit of tolling, and thus [deny them] the class action
mechanism, when no defect in the class itself has been
shown.256
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of class certification is a determination that the underlying claims are not appropriate for class
treatment . . . . A different result is appropriate when the first court . . . rules only that the currently
named class representatives are unsuitable”) (citation omitted).
257. 827 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1987).
258. Id. at 876.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 875-76.
261. Id. at 879.
262. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974) (citation omitted). The
lower federal courts have cited the need to afford notice to the defendant in holding that a class
action against one defendant does not toll the statute of limitations on class members’ claims against
a different defendant. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567 (6th
In dicta, another federal Court of Appeals left open the possibility that
it, too, might toll the statute of limitations in certain successive class
actions. In Korwek v. Hunt,  the Second Circuit held that the statute of257
limitations was not tolled in a successive class action filed on behalf of a
broad class of commodities traders.  In an earlier class action, the district258
court had declined to certify the same broad class, concluding that there
would be “significant problems of manageability and intraclass conflict,”259
and instead had drastically limited the scope of the class certified.260
Although the Court of Appeals declined to toll the statute of limitations in
the successive class action filed on behalf of the broader class that had
been rejected earlier, “it le[ft] for another day the question of whether the
filing of a potentially proper subclass would be entitled to tolling under
American Pipe.”  In other words, the court acknowledged the possibility261
that the statute of limitations and Rule 23 policies, taken together, might
justify tolling in a case where the putative representative in the successive
class action was not seeking to have certified a class that already had been
rejected.
V.  A RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS
With this discussion of case law as a backdrop, let us reexamine the
issue of tolling in the successive class action context with an eye to all
three rings: the statute of limitations policies, the Rule 23 policies, and the
preclusion policies.
A.  Analysis of the Statute of Limitations Policies
As the Supreme Court recognized in American Pipe, the filing of a
class action complaint within the statutory period provides the defendants
with notice “not only of the substantive claims being brought against them,
but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who
may participate in the judgment.”  Thus, the defendants are in a position262
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Cir. 2005); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977); Prieto v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518-19 (N.D. Tex. 2001), aff’d w/o pub. op., 35 Fed. Appx. 390
(5th Cir. 2002).
263. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55.
264. Cf. id. (citation omitted).
to gather documents, depose witnesses and otherwise prepare their defense
vis-à-vis all members of the class. If the court in the first action declines
to certify the class and another class member commences a substantively
identical successive class action, the defendants cannot claim surprise or
lack of notice of the claims presented. The defendants may claim that their
interest in putting the entire dispute behind them is frustrated if the statute
of limitations is tolled, but the same argument was available in American
Pipe, where the Court concluded that the “polic[y] of ensuring essential
fairness to defendants . . . [is] satisfied . . . .” as long as “the defendants
have the essential information necessary to determine both the subject
matter and size of the prospective litigation” within the statutory period.263
Thus, the primary purpose of the statute of limitations—to provide repose
to the defendant—is no more frustrated in a second class action than in the
procedural settings presented in American Pipe and Crown, Cork.
Nor are the other statute of limitations policies likely to be undermined
if the statute is tolled in the successive class action context. Since the filing
of the initial class action complaint within the statutory period affords the
defendant an opportunity to preserve necessary evidence, the court
entertaining the second class action should be in no worse a position
adjudicating the claim (in terms of the “freshness” of the evidence) than a
court entertaining either an intervenor’s claim presented in the context of
the original action or an absent class member’s individual action filed after
denial of class certification. The evidence may not be as fresh as it would
have been had the first action, filed within the statutory period, proceeded
to trial; but it should be no less fresh than it would be in the American Pipe
and Crown, Cork settings.
To the extent that statutes of limitations are designed to reduce the
volume of litigation, there will be less litigation if absent class members
who wish to press their claims following denial of class certification
proceed together in the context of a successive class action than if they sue
individually. Of course, there would be even less litigation if their claims
were too small to provide an incentive to sue separately and a successive
class action were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds; but that
result would be at odds with the Rule 23 policies to be discussed shortly.
Finally, absent class members who wait until resolution of the
certification issue in the original class action before pursuing other
litigation options can hardly be accused of sleeping on their rights.  To264
the extent they refrain from filing an individual action or a competing class
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265. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
266. See CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1154-55 (noting that “[t]olling the limitations period a second,
third or fourth time, dramatically shifts the balance of equities in favor of the plaintiffs—and against
the defendants—with respect to the period of repose”) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also
FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 406 (concluding that “additional suits beyond the saving statute
period following dismissal of a suit commenced within the original limitation should not be
permitted. To permit such repetitious litigation to repeatedly extend the period defeats the purpose
of the statutes of limitations and is contrary to the intent and purpose of the saving statute”).
267. 139 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1998).
268. 765 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1985).
269. 17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).
action while the motion to certify the class is pending, their forbearance
serves the efficiency objectives underlying Rule 23 and should not result
in the forfeiture of their claims.
Before we move on to consider the Rule 23 policies, two additional
points regarding the statute of limitations policies should be made. First,
the statutes of limitations balance not only the policies described
above—which counsel in favor of limiting the time in which plaintiffs may
file suit—but also several competing policies, which counsel in favor of
affording plaintiffs a lengthy period of time in which to sue.  If the statute265
of limitations were not tolled, then absent class members who justifiably
relied upon a pending class action to protect their interests would be denied
a reasonable opportunity to sue. Likewise, the substantive law underlying
their claims would not be enforced and neither specific nor general
deterrence would be achieved. Thus, these competing statute of limitations
policies are furthered if the statute is tolled during the pendency of the first
class action.
Second, the foregoing discussion appears to support tolling when absent
class members file a second class action on behalf of the same class
presenting the same claims, but we have not yet considered the possibility
that a certification motion in the second class action might be denied and
absent class members might seek to bring a third (and then a fourth . . .)
successive class action. If preclusion doctrine does not bar these successive
actions and the statute of limitations is tolled each time, then at least
theoretically there could be as many putative class actions as there are class
members. Thus, there might well come a point where a court reasonably
would conclude that tolling would significantly frustrate the statute of
limitations policy of providing the defendant with repose.  In fact, it bears266
mentioning that most of the cases decided by the federal Courts of Appeals
that have adopted the majority view involved more than two successive
class actions brought on behalf of the same group of plaintiffs. In Basch v.
Ground Round,  Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n,267 268
and Griffin v. Singletary,  for example, the Courts of Appeals for the269
First, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits respectively held that tolling was
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270. Basch, 139 F.3d at 7; Salazar-Calderon, 765 F.2d at 1349-50; Griffin, 17 F.3d at 358-59.
271. 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988).
272. Id. at 148.
273. 827 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1987).
274. 835 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1987).
275. Korwek, 827 F.2d at 875-76; Robbin, 835 F.2d at 213-14.
276. McKowan Lowe Comment, supra note 7, at 2236 (stating that “[a] plaintiff class that
meets the class-specific requirements of Rule 23(a) [i.e., numerosity and commonality] will almost
certainly be able to put forth a sufficient representative without too much trouble”) (footnote
omitted). Likewise, if the initial court denies certification because of a problem with the class that
can be remedied, it should not take many “tries” for a representative to re-define the class in such
a way as to remedy the problem.
unavailable in the fourth class action filed on behalf of the same class
members.  In Andrews v. Orr,  the Sixth Circuit held that tolling was270 271
unavailable in the third class action filed.  Only Korwek v. Hunt  and272 273
Robbin v. Fluor Corp.,  decided by the Second and Ninth Circuits274
respectively, involved just two class actions.  Finally, although the risk275
of multiple successive class actions deserves consideration, it is not likely
to create a significant problem. If the court entertaining the initial class
action denies certification because of a problem with the class itself that
cannot be remedied (such as unmanageability), then the preclusion policies
to be discussed in Part V.C independently may counsel against tolling in
this context. If, on the other hand, the initial court denies certification only
because of a problem with the putative class representative, the court
should not take many “tries” to find a suitable representative and the risk
of repetitive class actions would not be great.276
B.  Analysis of the Rule 23 Policies
When a plaintiff chooses to bring a class action on behalf of a group of
similarly situated persons rather than sue individually (or decline to sue
because the transaction costs are too high), some or all of the Rule 23
policies identified in Part III.B.1 are advanced. These same policies are
advanced when a district court declines to certify a class and an absent
member of the would-be class decides to bring a second class action rather
than sue individually.
To illustrate, let us imagine a would-be class with 1,000 similarly
situated class members. If a district court declines to certify the class when
the first would-be representative sues, the remaining 999 class members
have several choices. First, some or all of them may decline to press their
claims. Second, as in American Pipe, some or all of them may seek to
intervene in the first plaintiff’s action, assuming that action is not
dismissed and the original plaintiff proceeds to litigate her individual
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277. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
279. This list of options may not be exhaustive.
280. See supra Part III.B.1.
claim.  Third, as in Crown, Cork, some or all of the 999 remaining class277
members may commence individual lawsuits.  Fourth, one or several of278
the remaining class members may commence a second class action.  In279
deciding whether to toll the statute of limitations in the context of the
successive class action, the court should consider whether the Rule 23
policies would be frustrated if the statute of limitations were not tolled in
this context but were tolled in the American Pipe and Crown, Cork
alternative contexts.
A primary Rule 23 policy is efficiency and judicial economy.  A280
successive positive-value class action brought on behalf of the entire class
would expend fewer judicial resources than 999 individual lawsuits and
would be far more efficient than a lawsuit with 999 individual intervenors.
Thus, a decision declining to toll the statute of limitations in the context of
the successive class action would appear to frustrate this Rule 23 policy.
Of course, if, in the absence of a successive class action, none or few of the
absent class members would sue individually or seek to intervene, then a
decision declining to toll the statute of limitations for a negative-value
class action would conserve the most judicial resources, but other Rule 23
policies would be frustrated.
If the statute of limitations were tolled and absent class members were
permitted to proceed together in a successive class action, they could pool
their resources and spread the costs of litigation among the class.
Otherwise, they might have to forego litigation altogether (and any hope
of compensation) or incur the costs of individual litigation or intervention.
Thus, a decision declining to toll the statute of limitations in the context of
a successive class action could impede access to the courts, at least where
the claims are small relative to the costs of litigation.
Likewise, if the claims of the absent class members were so small that
it would not be cost-effective to sue individually or even to intervene in the
original plaintiff’s action, then a successive negative-value class action
would be needed to enforce the substantive law underlying the class
members’ claims. Thus, if the statute of limitations were not tolled and the
successive class action alternative were not available, no individual claims
would be brought, no wrongdoers would be deterred from violating the law
(in the absence of governmental action), and no law would be enforced.
On the other hand, if the claims were worth enough to justify individual
suits by some or all of the absent class members, a decision declining to
toll the statute of limitations in the positive-value successive class action
context would expose the defendant to multiple lawsuits and the risk of
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281. While a decision to certify a class in the successive class action might be inconsistent with
the decision of the first court declining to certify the class, the defendant nevertheless would be
protected from the risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1)(A).
282. See supra Part III.B.2.
potentially inconsistent judgments.  Thus, another of the Rule 23 policies281
would be frustrated if the statute of limitations were not tolled. Moreover,
because the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members
would expose the defendant to the risk of inconsistent orders or impede
each class member’s ability to protect her interest in a limited fund, the
argument for tolling for Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) successive class actions is
heightened.
Finally, a decision declining to toll the statute of limitations in this
circumstance would invite the very precautionary filing of either individual
lawsuits or dueling class actions during the pendency of the original class
action that American Pipe and Crown, Cork sought to discourage.  Taken282
together, then, the first two rings—the statute of limitations policies and
the Rule 23 policies—support tolling of the statute of limitations in the
successive class action context. Let us now turn to the third ring—the
preclusion policies—to understand the role they play in the final analysis.
C.  Analysis of the Preclusion Policies
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that, for the reasons
described in Part IV.B, preclusion doctrine may not bar absent class
members from filing a successive class action or even from relitigating
issues that were decided against the putative representative in the earlier
class action. So the issue is whether the policies that underlie that doctrine
nevertheless should influence the tolling question in the successive class
action context. One may argue that if preclusion doctrine itself does not bar
absent class members from filing a successive class action or from
relitigating certification issues, either because the order denying
certification was not sufficiently final, or because, in the absence of a
certification order, the absent class members were not represented by the
putative class representative, or for some other reason, then the policies
underlying that doctrine should not influence the tolling decision. In other
words, there may be good reasons why preclusion doctrine does not bar
relitigation of the certification issue in a successive class action; so courts
frustrated by the prospect of relitigation should not circumvent the limits
of preclusion doctrine by declining to invoke the American Pipe tolling
rule in this context. If the courts are sufficiently dissatisfied with the result
that preclusion doctrine yields, they should address the problem directly
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283. See, e.g., 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 171, § 4434, at 110 (noting that “[r]ecent
decisions have relaxed traditional views of the finality requirement by applying issue preclusion to
matters resolved by preliminary rulings . . . .”); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 2.10 cmt. c (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 2005) (stating that “[a] mere cosmetic change in the proposed
class representative . . . should not defeat same-party status where the class for which certification
is now being sought is the same as the one for which class certification was previously denied . . .”).
through a modification of preclusion doctrine itself,  rather than indirectly283
through a denial of tolling that otherwise would be justified by the statute
of limitations and Rule 23 policies alone. Under this view, courts would
toll the statute of limitations in the successive class action context
regardless of whether the initial certification order was denied because of
a problem with the class or because of a problem with the representative,
as long as the policies underlying the statute of limitations and Rule 23
would be served thereby. None of the Courts of Appeals that have
addressed the tolling issue in the successive class action context has
adopted this position.
Alternatively, one may argue that even if preclusion doctrine does not
itself bar absent class members from filing a successive class action, the
policies underlying preclusion doctrine properly may be considered in
deciding whether to toll the statute of limitations in this context. After all,
the American Pipe tolling rule is an equitable doctrine and courts applying
it should consider the legitimate policy concerns underlying preclusion
doctrine even when preclusion doctrine itself would not preclude
relitigation. Under this view, the reason for the district court’s denial of
certification in the initial class action may prove relevant.
A district court may decline to certify a class for a variety of reasons.
In some cases, there may be problems with the class itself—the class may
not satisfy the numerosity requirement, the questions that are common to
members of the class may not predominate over the individual questions
in a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class, great difficulties may likely be
encountered in managing the action, or serious conflicts of interest may
exist among class members. Unless the class definition is changed or sub-
classes are employed, these problems are likely to persist in any successive
class action.
In other cases, there may be problems with the proposed class
representative—her claims may not be typical of the claims held by the
class, she may not be an adequate representative of the class because her
lawyer lacks experience with class actions, or serious conflicts of interest
may exist between the class and the would-be representative. In these
cases, if a different prospective class member were to initiate a successive
class action, these problems might be overcome. With these differences in
mind, let us consider how the introduction of the third ring—the preclusion
policies—may affect the tolling analysis.
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284. See supra Part IV.A (discussing preclusion policies).
285. I do not mean to suggest that the creation of subclasses with separate representation
always will solve potential conflicts among class members. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 109, at 783-
85.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 278-81.
287. See supra notes 103-04, 132-33, 261-62, and accompanying text. For the argument that
a class action complaint fails to provide such notice in mass tort class actions, see Lowenthal &
Feder, supra note 7, at 575-77.
To the extent that preclusion doctrine is designed to conserve judicial
resources and promote efficiency, it may well be that tolling the statute of
limitations in the successive positive-value class action context would
better serve these policies than would a large number of individual
actions.  If certification in the initial proceeding was denied because of284
a problem with the representative or even a problem with the class that can
be corrected—for example, the class as initially proposed suffered from
intra-class conflicts, but the new class action complaint proposes
subclasses, each to be represented by separate counsel, and other structural
changes to avoid intra-class conflicts —then a second class action may285
be far more efficient than multiple individual lawsuits by the absent class
members.286
On the other hand, if certification in the initial proceeding was denied
because of a problem that cannot be corrected—for example, the class is
simply too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement—then repeated
relitigation of the certification issue in successive class actions will be
unproductive, inefficient, and wasteful of judicial resources. Thus, if it is
proper for courts to consider the preclusion policies in resolving the tolling
issue, then efficiency concerns would counsel against tolling in cases
where the putative representative merely seeks to relitigate the identical
issue presented in the earlier class action, rather than to address the
problems that resulted in a denial of certification in the first suit.
In gauging the role that the policy objectives of finality and repose
should play in this analysis, one must recall that under American Pipe and
Crown, Cork, the statute of limitations is tolled for absent class members
who seek to intervene in the original action or file their own individual
actions upon denial of a motion for class certification. In those cases, the
Court concluded that the defendant’s interest in repose was protected as
long as the initial class action provided sufficient notice of the subject
matter and size of the prospective litigation and an opportunity to gather
the materials necessary to put on a vigorous defense.  Thus, the real287
question here is whether the defendant’s interests in finality and repose will
be compromised more in the successive class action context than in the
intervention or individual action contexts contemplated by the Court.
If a defendant defeats a certification motion in an initial class action and
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288. See, e.g., Yang, 392 F.3d at 104 (distinguishing between denial of certification for
problems with the class and for problems with the representative) (citations omitted). But see
Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that such a no-
tolling rule “appears to undermine the utility of class actions, since it permits an erroneous denial
of class certification to effectively foreclose the claims of all class members who do not have a
sufficient financial stake to warrant their commencing or intervening in an individual action”), aff’d
without op., 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997).
289. See, for example, supra notes 239-55 and accompanying text, discussing the Yang case.
290. Note that the defendant is not really relitigating the issue of the putative representative’s
adequacy because the question of representative A’s adequacy is a different issue from
representative B’s adequacy.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 265-75.
292. CSS VI, 232 F.3d at 1147 (distinguishing between cases in which the plaintiffs in the
the identical issue is raised in a successive class action, the interest in
finality is frustrated. Likewise, relitigation of an issue already decided in
the initial class action creates a risk of inconsistent results and the
concomitant loss of confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the judicial
process. These risks are greatest if the complaint in the successive class
action alleges the same claims on behalf of the same class, but seeks a
different result. Thus, when there is a problem with the class itself as
initially defined—for example, it lacks numerosity or the questions
common to all class members do not predominate over the individual
questions—and the complaint in the successive class action does not seek
to remedy those problems, then the threat to finality and the risk of
inconsistency counsel against tolling of the statute of limitations.288
On the other hand, when the problem in the initial class action is with
the putative representative—for example, her claims are atypical—then the
risk of inconsistency is eliminated when the successive class action is filed
on behalf of a different plaintiff (whose claims may well be typical).289
Granted, the threat to finality is not eliminated as long as the defendant
must relitigate against a new representative an issue upon which the
defendant already prevailed.  But if the choice is between relitigation of290
the certification issue one more time in a successive class action or
repetitive litigation of the merits in a multitude of individual actions, it is
hard to conclude that interests in finality and consistency counsel against
tolling in the successive class action context. Of course, if there are a string
of repetitive class actions, each brought by a different putative class
representative, there might well come a point where tolling would
significantly frustrate the preclusion policies of finality and repose and a
court reasonably would decline to the toll the statute of limitations.291
Finally, even if the problem in the initial class action is with the class
itself—for example, there are intra-class conflicts—the risk of
inconsistency is eliminated as long as the complaint in the successive class
action seeks to “cure the deficiency” identified in the earlier class action.292
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successive class action seek to relitigate the correctness of the denial of certification and cases in
which the later plaintiffs “do [] not disagree with the denial of class certification, but rather tr[y]
to cure the deficiency that led to the denial”); see also Korwek, 827 F.2d at 879 (“leav[ing] for
another day the question of whether the filing of a potentially proper subclass would be entitled to
tolling under American Pipe”).
Put differently, since the issue to be resolved by the court will not be
identical if the complaint in the successive class action seeks to redefine
the class or add structural protections to address the conflicts of interest,
there is no risk that the same issue will be resolved differently the second
time around. Since the interest in finality is no more compromised here
than when the problem is with the named representative, it is hard to
conclude that the preclusion policies of finality and consistency counsel
against tolling in the successive class action context as long as the plaintiff
seeks to remedy the problem that resulted in a denial of certification in the
initial class action.
VI.  CONCLUSION
A majority of the federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that the
statute of limitations should not be tolled in the successive class action
context. A careful analysis of the various competing policies at play calls
this conclusion into question in at least two common circumstances. First,
the statute of limitations typically should be tolled where certification
initially was denied because of a problem with the class representative and
a new plaintiff who does not suffer from that problem commences the
successive class action. Second, the statute of limitations typically should
be tolled where certification initially was denied because of a problem with
the class itself and the successive class action seeks to remedy that
problem. Only where there is a problem with the class itself and the
successive class action fails to address that problem does the combination
of relevant policies counsel against tolling. Even in this situation, it might
be the better course for courts to address directly any perceived limitations
in preclusion doctrine itself rather than to tinker with tolling rules in an
effort to further the policies underlying preclusion doctrine.
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